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LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, in his 
private and individual capacity, on behalf 
of himself and others similarly situated 
RYAN S. WALTERS, 
MICHAEL E. SHOTWELL and 
RICHARD A. CONRAD, ET AL., on behalf 
of themselves and others similarly situated           PLAINTIFFS 
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Department of Health and Human Services; 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
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GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the 
Secretary of the United States Department 
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA 
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary 
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1I. INTRODUCTION. 
This case is about the continuing vitality of our longstanding federalist system.  The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (APPACA@ or Athe Act@) represents an unprecedented 
intrusion on the sovereignty of the States and the freedom of their citizens.  As such, it threatens to 
destroy our traditional system of dual sovereignty - our compound republic - under which the 
federal government is to exercise only those limited powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, 
with all other powers reserved to the States or the people.  See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992).  This system, as Justice Kennedy explained in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (concurring), Awas the unique contribution of the Framers to political 
science and political theory.@  It was designed to achieve a Ahealthy balance of power between the 
States and the Federal Government [to] reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front[,]@
by empowering both governments so that each Awill control [the] other . . . .@ Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-22 (1997).  In enacting the PPACA, Congress upends that balance, 
usurping powers denied it and thereby inflicting the very harm warned of in Printz. 
Specifically, Petitioners are profoundly affected by ' 1501 of the PPACA, the Aindividual
mandate@ (called the "minimum coverage provision" in Defendant's motion), which dictates that 
Americans purchase a healthcare insurance policy for themselves and their families or be 
penalized.  Thus, for the first time in American history, Congress is requiring that Americans 
enter a marketplace and purchase a product, whether it is wanted or not.  The individual mandate 
will go into effect after December 31, 2013, and Petitioners have no intention of abiding by its 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (AHCERA@).
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2unconstitutional demand to purchase insurance or to pay a penalty for their inactivity.  
Without question, the individual mandate is manifestly unconstitutional.  No enumerated 
power of Congress permits this assertion of top-down centralized economic power; nor can the 
Necessary and Proper Clause expand congressional power to support the mandate.  Congress=s
commerce power extends to regulation of activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, but does not allow it to compel inactive individuals to enter a marketplace against their 
will.  Likewise, Congress=s power to tax does not authorize it to compel persons to purchase 
specific insurance products.  By exerting such sweeping authority over individual decisions, 
Congress has seized powers denied it under the Tenth Amendment, in violation of the 
Constitution=s federalist structure and individual rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 
For the sake of our republic, the constitutional limits imposed on the federal government 
must stand for something.  To find that the mandate is constitutional would be the first-ever 
interpretation of the Commerce power, the Necessary and Proper Clause or the taxing power to 
permit the regulation of inactivity B commanding an individual to affirmatively engage in an 
economic transaction.  If allowed, A[t]he federal government would then have wide authority to 
require that Americans engage in activities of its choosing, from eating spinach and joining gyms B
in the health care realm B to buying cars from General Motors.@  Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against 
health Reform Are Well Grounded in Law B And Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229, 
1232 (June 2010).  A dismissal of the Amended Petition would grant Congress unlimited power 
to regulate, prohibit, or mandate any or all activities in the United States.  Such a doctrine would 
abolish any limit on federal power and forever alter the fundamental relationship of the national 
government to the states and the people.  
Americans repeatedly have expressed concern and opposition to the health care law, and a 
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3large-and-still-growing majority say they want it repealed.  In the historic elections of November 
2, 2010, the well-respected Rasmussen Reports conducted exit polls and found that 59% of those 
who voted on Election Day favor repealing the PPACA - numbers that have been pretty consistent 
since the troubling health care measure was passed in March 2010.   Rassmussen Reports, Nov. 2, 
2010.  The day before the election, Rassmussen wrote in the Wall Street Journal: 
Central to the Democrats' electoral woes was the debate on 
health-care reform. From the moment in May 2009 when the 
Congressional Budget Office announced that the president's plan 
would cost a trillion dollars, most voters opposed it. Today 53% 
want to repeal it. Opposition was always more intense than support, 
and opposition was especially high among senior citizens, who vote 
in high numbers in midterm elections. 
Scott Rassmussen, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 1, 2010.  The byline to this opinion article states: 
"Voters don't want to be governed from the left, right or center. They want Washington to 
recognize that Americans want to govern themselves."  Indeed, self-government is a 
quintessentially American idea, and the desire to govern ourselves is a defining characteristic of 
our nation.  A major reason that the PPACA is so unpopular is the liberty-robbing individual 
mandate.  Americans recognize that there is something quite un-American with a government 
dictating to citizens that they must buy government approved health insurance whether they want 
it or not. 
 Defendants' memorandum is replete with political arguments about why the health 
insurance reforms in the Act were both necessary and a good idea, but such arguments as to 
whether or not reform was needed (or whether the Act is even capable of delivering on its 
promises) are completely beside the point.  Americans cherish liberty, and we live in the freest 
nation on earth because the people have reserved power to the states and to themselves, granting 
only a limited amount of power to the federal government.  Unless a power is specifically 
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4enumerated in the United States Constitution, it is not a power that the federal government 
possesses.  The power to dictate to the people that they must purchase a government-approved 
health insurance plan cannot be found in all of the Constitution.  To allow the individual mandate 
to stand would be to afford Congress unlimited power and destroy the limitations our founding 
fathers imposed on the government.  
ARGUMENT 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE, AND THEIR CHALLENGE IS RIPE. 
A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) “is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).  
Rule 12(b) (6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  A court must not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a 
claim unless the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible 
on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Sonnier v. State Farm, 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).   
In ruling on motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “accepts all 
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 204 (5th Cir. 2007). The reviewing court must also “resolve 
any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff.” 
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). 
A. Petitioners have standing.  
To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) Ainjury in fact@; (2) a casual 
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) harm that will be Aredressed by 
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5a favorable decision.@ Lujan Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  The latter 
elements plainly are met, since when a plaintiff is the object of governmental action, Athere is 
ordinarily little question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing 
. . . the action will redress it.@  Indeed, Defendants concede the latter elements by disputing only 
Petitioners= injuries-in-fact.   
 "The 'essence' of standing is 'whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the 
merits of the dispute or of particular issues.'" Mississippi State Democratic Party v. Barbour, 529 
F.3d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 2008).  In order to have standing, “a plaintiff must show: (1) it has 
suffered, or imminently will suffer, a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) the injury is 
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) a favorable judgment is likely to redress the 
injury.” Id.  "An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 'actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'"  Id. The individual mandate by its terms applies to 
individual Petitioners.  Am. Pet. && 21-28.  As shown below, the mandate causes Petitioners 
concrete, actual, and imminent injury.  No further administrative action is required to trigger the 
mandate=s facially coercive effects, and the court=s assessment of its constitutionality vel non will 
not be assisted by any actual experience with its application.   
 Defendants make factual arguments as to whether any plaintiffs will suffer an injury, 
however, in this 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may not weigh evidence or engage in 
speculation.  Instead, the allegations of the amended petition must be accepted as fact, and "'mere 
allegations of injury' are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing."  
State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., - F. Supp. 2d -, 2010 WL 4010119 (N. 
D. Fla.), quoting Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329, (1999).  
Petitioners have alleged that the individual mandate will require Petitioners to apply for and 
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6purchase qualifying healthcare insurance, even though they do not have it and do not want it.  Am. 
Pet. && 25, 26.  Thus, they are forced either to enter into an economic transaction they want no 
part of or be penalized monetarily.  Since Petitioners allege direct economic harm from the 
PPACA=s impending mandate, standing to assert their claims clearly exists. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. 
Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1999).  Plainly, their alleged economic injuries are Adistinct 
and palpable.@  These are not mere Ageneralized grievances@ about how tax dollars may be spent, 
or based on infringement of a broad right to constitutional government, as asserted in Daimler 
Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342-43 (2006), and similar cases on which Defendants rely.  
Def. Mem. 8-11. 
The plaintiffs have numerous allegations in the amended petition that are relevant to the 
standing issue.  Indeed, Petitioners have not merely alleged that they have no intention of either 
abiding by the individual mandate or paying the penalty, they have strongly promised that they 
will resist the statute.  Given this fact alone, the ripeness inquiry is satisfied: 
Related to the standing requirement is the question of ripeness. In 
the [constitutional] context involving a pre-enforcement challenge, 
the ripeness inquiry focuses on how imminent the threat of 
prosecution is and whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an 
intention to refuse to comply with the statute in order to ensure that 
the fear of prosecution is genuine and the alleged infringement on 
[constitutional] rights is concrete and credible as opposed to being 
speculative or imaginative. 
Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (W. D. La. 1999) (First Amendment 
freedom of speech case) (emphasis added).   
B. The individual mandate=s future effective date, which is definite, does not 
deprive Petitioners of standing or violate the requirement of ripeness. 
 The crux of Defendants' standing arguments are that Petitioners= injuries are too 
Aindefinite@ or too far in the future to support standing, Def. Mem. 8-11, but courts repeatedly have 
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7found standing to pursue a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge where the alleged harm will 
occur in the future.  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521-23 (standing based on rise in 
sea levels by the end of this century); Pierce v. Soc=y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (standing 
to challenge education act before effective date; while the Supreme Court did not quantify the 
Alead time,@ the lower court had identified it as at least two years and five months at 296 F. 928, 
933 (D. Or. 1924)); Dep=t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Reps., 525 U.S. 316, 332 (1999) (standing 
in February 1998 to challenge sampling method for 2000 Census); Vill. of Bensenvill v. FAA, 376 
F.3d 1114, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (standing to contest fees not collectible for 13 years).   
 Standing Adepends on the probability of harm, not its temporal proximity.@ See 520 S. 
Mich. Ave. Assocs. v. Devine, 433 F.3d 961, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).  As discussed 
infra, Defendants concede the "probability of harm" by stating that millions of people will pay 
billions in penalties, yet they argue that the enforcement date is so far away that there is no 
"immediacy."  As the Eleventh Circuit has held, Aimmediacy requires only that the anticipated 
injury occur with some fixed period of time in the future, not that it happen in the colloquial sense 
of soon or precisely within a certain number of days, weeks, or months.@  Fla. State Conf. of the 
NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).  Individual 
Petitioners must comply with the individual mandate after December 31, 2013.  PPACA '
1501(b).  That date is fixed in the law and is certain to occur; it is a statutory certainty.  
Defendants= reliance on Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), and similar 
authorities is misplaced.  The issue in those cases was not passage of time, but the contingent and 
thus uncertain nature of the alleged injuries.  Whitmore involved a prisoner=s challenge to 
procedures that would not affect him unless he could secure federal habeas relief from his 
conviction and sentence.  See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 226 (2003) (U.S. Senator 
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8would not be affected by challenged provisions unless he chose to run for reelection five years 
later); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (no standing to seek injunction prohibiting 
police from potential future use of Achoke holds@); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (plaintiff expressed only 
vague intention Asome day@ to return to Sri Lanka to observe endangered species); Connecticut v. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 343 n.19 (2d Cir. 2009) (confirming Petitioners= reading of 
McDonnell). 
State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs. is a case that is "on all fours" with 
the instant matter, since it was brought by the Attorney General of the State of Florida alleging that 
the individual mandate is unconstitutional.  In that case, the court recently held that "the injury 
alleged in this case will not occur at 'some indefinite future time.' Instead, the date is definitively 
fixed in the Act and will occur in 2014, when the individual mandate goes into effect and the 
individual plaintiffs are forced to buy insurance or pay the penalty."   State of Florida v. U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2010 WL 4010119 at *18.  That holding is entirely consistent 
with the holding of this court in in Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Fordice, where the plaintiff argued that it 
had suffered past economic harm and "is threatened with future economic losses."  Illinois Cent. 
R. Co. v. Fordice, 30 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 (S. D. Miss. 1997).  Judge Wingate held that "the threat 
of future harm to the plaintiff and its employees is real and immediate," reasoning that if the court 
"determine[d] the state statute under which the defendants were acting is null and void, plaintiff 
will not be subjected to such intrusions again and, therefore, will not suffer the same economic 
injuries."  Id. (emphasis added).   
C. Defendants' own research about what the future will hold disproves their 
assertion that the threat plaintiffs face is "imaginary or speculative." 
In a variation of their temporal proximity argument, Defendants argue that the "threat" 
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9plaintiffs' face is "imaginary or speculative" merely because the individual mandate penalty will 
not start being collected until 2015 (thus disingenuously ignoring the entire year of 2104, when the 
mandate goes into effect).  Def. Mem. 9.  However, there is nothing speculative or contingent 
about Petitioners= claims:  the mandate will take effect on January 1, 2014, and will apply to 
individual Petitioners.  Petitioners do not now have qualifying coverage, and have no intention of 
changing their status in this regard.  Am. Compel && 27, 28.  Their injuries are not contingent 
upon further act or decision on their part.  The only speculation here is by Defendants.  Def. 
Mem. 8-11.2
Defendants have provided us with ample proof that millions of people will not only be 
subject to a potential penalty, but will actually be forced to pay penalties under the Act.  Based 
upon a CBO report, Defendants have asserted that the penalty will raise about "$4 billion in annual 
revenue."  Def. Mem. 43.  The CBO and JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation) have calculated that 
"[i]n total, about 4 million people are projected to pay a penalty because they will be uninsured in 
2016 (a figure that includes uninsured dependents who have the penalty paid on their behalf)."3
Thus, instead of demonstrating that these penalties are imaginary or speculative, Defendants have 
actually calculated that millions of individuals who are in fact subject to the individual mandate 
will fail to comply with its dictates, thus violating the law and incurring penalties of billions of 
2 Petitioners need only show that their injury is probable, not that it is absolutely 
certain. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (Aprobability@ that landlord=s
rent would be reduced by law Asufficient threat of actual injury@ to satisfy Article III); Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers Nat=l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (standing where Arealistic danger of 
sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute= operation or enforcement@); ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. 
Miami-Dave County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1195-97 (11th Cir. 2009) (standing to challenge 
library=s ban of book plaintiff intended to check out later that year). 
3 Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, April 22, 2010 at 2 (emphasis added).   
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dollars in aggregate.   
Of course, even one single Petitioner=s standing affords yet another basis by which the 
court can consider the constitutionality of the individual mandate.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. at 518 (AOnly one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the 
petition for review.@); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (declining to bother to 
adjudicate a labor union=s standing where a union member alleged an injury-in-fact); Prejean v. 
Foster, 83 Fed.Appx. 5, 8 (5th Cir. 2003) ("In cases with multiple plaintiffs, the presence of at least 
one party with standing makes the case justiciable.").   Importantly, the figure of 4 million people 
is just the people who will be paying the penalty - obviously, the number of people who will be 
subject to the individual mandate and who will let themselves be coerced into involuntarily 
purchasing insurance will be even higher.  Defendants thus admit that the threat is "certainly 
impending," and by actually calculating the number of people who will be subject to the penalty 
and the amount in aggregate that they will pay, Defendants have shown that the threat of future 
enforcement is not speculative in the least.  
D. Petitioners= claims challenging the individual mandate are ripe. 
Ripeness turns on two factors:  Athe fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.@ Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 149 (1967).  As Defendants must admit, a Aconspicuous overlap@ exists between standing 
and ripeness inquiries in pre-enforcement challenges to statutes like the PPACA, where ripeness 
often turns on Awhether there is sufficient injury to meet Article III=s requirement of a case or 
controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined 
and concrete, to permit effective decision-making by the court.@ Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 
1211 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 27 of 95
11
Cir. 2009) (purely legal claim is Apresumptively ripe for judicial review@ because no developed 
factual record needed).  Here, all Petitioners allege that the individual mandate will cause them 
actual, concrete, and imminent injury. Am. Comp. && 21-28. 
Defendants cannot rely on the mandate=s effective date being in the future, because injury 
to Petitioners is inevitable and, A[w]here the inevitability of the operation of a statute against 
certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there 
will be a time delay before the disputed provisions come into effect.@ Blanchette v. Ct. Gen. Ins. 
Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974).  If Athe enforcement of a statute is certain, a pre-enforcement 
challenge will not be rejected on ripeness grounds.@  Browning, 522 F.3d at 1164 (emphasis 
added); See also Fla. League of Prof=l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 459 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(lobbying group=s prospective challenge to law=s constitutionality was ripe where group was faced 
with choice to Arefrain from engaging in protected First Amendment activity or risk civil sanction 
for alleged unethical conduct@); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53 (challenge to regulation was ripe 
where it was directed at plaintiffs, required them to change business practices, and subjected them 
to civil penalties for noncompliance).  This is particularly true where, as here, the challenge 
mainly raises questions of law.  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & 
Dev. Comm=n, 461 U.S. 190, 201-03 (1983) (case ripe where Apredominantly legal@ question 
raised). 
Nor is there any Auncertainty@ about whether the mandate will apply to Petitioners.  Unlike 
Toilet Goods Ass=n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1967), and cases like it, the individual 
mandate as written will impact Petitioners, regardless of any additional administrative action.  
Defendants= cases, Def. Mem. 13-14, are inapposite.  They involve either injuries contingent on 
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further agency action (ruling by arbitration tribunal in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 
473 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1985), completion of site selection process in Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 
854, 857 (9th Cir. 1990), additional FDA determinations in Toilet Goods)), or provisions 
forbidding conduct where no violation or desire to engage in the conduct was alleged (interference 
with voting rights in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 317 (1966), deprivation of 
rights by officials in Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 
17-18 (D.D.C. 2001)).  And unlike the FDA regulation at issue in Toilet Goods, the mandate=s
validity does not turn on factors (e.g., practical enforcement problems) such that the Ajudicial
appraisal . . . is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific application@ of 
the challenged provision.  Id. at 164.  Congress itself has established the individual mandate=s
metes and bounds.  Its practical application by the agencies enforcing it will not illuminate the 
legal issues now raised.  This case is fully ripe for adjudication.  See Virginia v. Sebelius, Mem. 
Op. at 15-17 (Aug. 2, 2010) (State=s challenge to the individual mandate is ripe). 
III. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT DOES NOT APPLY AND THEREFORE DOES 
NOT DEPRIVE PETITIONERS OF STANDING. 
The President, Congress and the PPACA all agree that the mandate is a "penalty" and that it 
is definitely not a tax.  However, in an attempt to shoehorn the mandate in under the protection of 
the Anti-Injunction Act, Defendants now enthusiastically embrace the "tax" label.  At least one 
court has criticized this "shift in position" as a blatant attempt to avoid accountability:  
In other words, the members of Congress would have reaped a 
political advantage by calling and treating it as a penalty while the 
Act was being debated [ ], and then reap a legal advantage by 
calling it a tax in court once it passed into law. See Def. Mem. at 
33-34, 49 (arguing that the Anti-Injunction Act bars any challenge 
to the penalty which, in any event, falls under Congress's “very 
extensive” authority to tax for the general welfare). This should not 
be allowed, and I am not aware of any reported case where it ever 
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has been. 
State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., - F. Supp. 2d -, 2010 WL 4010119 at *15 
(N.D. Fla.) (Roger Vinson, J.), 106 A.F.T.R. 2d 2010-676 (internal citations omitted).  This 
distasteful political maneuvering, however, ultimately does nothing to avail the defendants, since 
the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. ' 7421(a) (AAIA@) applies only to "taxes," and the individual 
mandate is clearly not a tax.   
 Whether the individual mandate penalty is a tax is an important question that not only 
implicates jurisdiction (vis-a-vis the Anti-Injunction Act), but it also goes to the merits of the 
individual mandate-related challenges of whether the penalty can be justified by, and enforced 
through, Congress’s taxing power, or whether the penalty must be analyzed instead under the more 
limited Commerce Clause authority.  The federal court for the Northern District of Florida has 
considered virtually identical arguments by the Defendants in the similar case against the PPCA 
filed there, and ruled that the individual mandate is not a "tax," but rather is a "penalty" that does 
not fall under the Anti-Injunction Act:  "[I]t is obvious that Congress did not pass the penalty, in 
the version of the legislation that is now 'the Act,' as a tax under its taxing authority, but rather as a 
penalty pursuant to its Commerce Clause power."  State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Svcs., supra.   
The mandate, which requires persons to have coverage, cannot be a tax subject to the AIA, 
because its stated purpose is not to raise revenue but to create Aeffective health insurance markets.@
See Goetz v. Glickman, 920 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (D. Kan. 1996), aff=d, 149 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999) (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)) (a 
regulation Awill not constitute a tax unless the real purpose and effect of the statute and regulations 
. . . is to raise revenues for the general support of the government.@); Cities Serv. Co. v. Fed. Energy 
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Admin., 529 F.2d 1016, 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (same); see also Def. Mem. 5 (quoting 
PPACA '' 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a)).  Indeed, the Individual mandate itself raises no revenue, and 
significantly, in enacting the mandate, Congress expressly relied on its commerce power.  Thus, 
the Act=s corresponding enforcement penalty also is not a tax.  As with the mandate itself, 
Congress grounded the penalty in the Commerce Clause, not in its taxing or spending powers.  It 
designed and denominated the penalty as a means to enforce the Individual mandate.  PPACA '
1501 at ' 5000A(b)(1).  By contrast, where Congress levies taxes, it identifies them as such B as it 
did in at least five other sections of the Act.  See , e.g., PPACA '' 9001, 9004, 9015, 9017 and 
10907.
Although his interpretation is not dispositive, it also bears noting that President Obama 
"strongly and emphatically denied that the penalty was a tax. When confronted with the dictionary 
definition of a 'tax' during a much publicized interview widely disseminated by all of the news 
media, and asked how the penalty did not meet that definition, the President said it was “absolutely 
not a tax” and, in fact, '[n]obody considers [it] a tax increase.'"  State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Svcs., 2010 WL 4010119 at *36 fn.5, citing Obama: Requiring Health 
Insurance is Not a Tax Increase, CNN, Sept. 29, 2009; see also George Stephanopoulos, Obama:
Mandate is Not a Tax, ABC News, Sept. 2009.  To date, the President has not backed down from 
his position that the mandate is not a tax; petitioners are thus in the unusual position of agreeing 
with the President while his representatives in court are taking a position opposite to him. 
Defendant argues that the mandate must be a tax because the penalty provision references 
the Internal Revenue Code.  Neither the Mandate=s placement in the Internal Revenue Code, nor 
its inclusion  in ASubtitle D B Miscellaneous Excise Taxes,@ may give rise to an inference or 
presumption of legislative construction.  See United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of 
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Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 222 (1996); 26 U.S.C. ' 7806(b) (providing that no inferences or 
implications can be made based on the penalty=s placement).  "Although the penalty is to be 
placed in the Internal Revenue Code under the heading 'Miscellaneous Excise Taxes,' the plain 
language of the Code itself states that this does not give rise to any inference or presumption that it 
was intended to be a tax." State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2010 WL 
4010119 at *9, citing United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 
213, 222-23 (1996) (citing to 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b), which provides that: “No inference, 
implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the 
location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this title”). 
If we were to follow Defendants' assertion that this provision is a tax, we are presented with 
the logical question, what is it a tax upon? For example, the Act contains a section stating:  “There 
is hereby imposed on any indoor tanning service a tax."  Excise Tax on Indoor Tanning Services, 
§ 10907 (emphasis added). It is therefore clear that Congress imposed a tax upon the sale of 
tanning services; likewise, the Act also states that "[t]here is hereby imposed on the sale of any 
taxable medical device by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax," which it labeled as 
"Excise Tax on Medical Device Manufacturers," § 1405 (emphasis added). So, with regard to the 
individual mandate, what is being taxed?  It is not a tax imposed on something that one buys, but 
on something that one refuses to buy; it is not a tax upon economic activity, but a so-called "tax" 
upon the refusal to engage in an economic activity.  Ergo, if it were a tax, it would be a tax on 
inactivity which, logically, is a tax on nothing at all.  This result demonstrates the absurdity of 
trying to characterize as a "tax" what is by definition a penalty. 
The individual mandate=s penalty was not enacted as a Atax@ and this is dispositive.  
Freemanville Water Sys. Inc. v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 563 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 
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2009) (A[W]here Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is 
controlling.@).  Defendants treat Athe statutory label of the provision as a >penalty=@ as 
inconsequential, Def. Mem. 30 n.12.  But it is well settled that Awhen Congress uses different 
language in similar sections it intends different meanings.@ DIRECTV, Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 
814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004).   
Even Defendants characterize the penalty as generating only Asome revenue,@ Def. Mem. 
30, and then only as an incident to some persons= failure to obey the law.  See Rodgers v. United 
States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943) (if regulation is statute=s primary purpose, Athe mere fact 
that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax, but a sanction 
imposed for the purpose of making effective the congressional enactment.@). Indeed, when this 
so-called "tax" operates as intended, it raises no revenue at all, because it forces people to engage 
in an economic activity that is then not taxed.   
The Act itself refers to the individual mandate's penal enforcement mechanism as a 
"penalty" repeatedly.  Congress specifically called this provision a "penalty" eighteen different 
times in Section 5000A alone; not one time in over 2,700 pages did Congress ever refer to it as a 
"tax."   Contemporaneous legislative history confirms that Congress enacted a Apenalty@ and not 
a Atax.@  Congress=s Joint Committee on Taxation (AJCT@), which analyzes the effects of proposed 
taxes,4 and on which Defendants rely, Def. Mem. 30, consistently refers to the penalty as a 
Apenalty@ in its technical explanation of the law.5  The JCT also conspicuously fails to estimate 
4
See JCT, Overview of Revenue Estimating Procedures and Methodologies Used by 
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCX-1-05), February 2, 2005, at 2.  Defendants 
admit that the JCT staff is Aclosely involved with every aspect of the legislative process . . . .@  Def. 
Mem. 51 n.24. 
5
See JCT, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the AReconciliation
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 33 of 95
17
any revenue from the penalty B whereas it dutifully scored the PPACA=s numerous other 
provisions imposing true taxes.  Defendants, of course, cite Congressional Budget Office 
(ACBO@) estimates, but the CBO Ahas responsibility for scoring the budget effects of non-tax
legislation.@ See JCX-1-05, at 16.  Congress enacted a penalty, as it clearly intended and 
understood, and not a Atax.@
As the October 14, 2010 opinion in State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of HHS also points out, 
Congress’s failure to call the penalty a “tax” is especially significant in light of the fact that the Act 
itself imposes a number of taxes in several other sections.  2010 WL 4010119 at *8.  "This shows 
beyond question that Congress knew how to impose a tax when it meant to do so. Therefore, the 
strong inference and presumption must be that Congress did not intend for the “penalty” to be a 
tax."  2010 WL 4010119 at *8, citing Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905) (where 
the statute uses “tax” in one section and “penalty” in another, courts “cannot go far afield” in 
treating the exaction as it is called; to do otherwise “would be a distortion of the words 
employed”), and (“It is well settled that ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’).   As the Fifth 
Act of 2010,@ as amended, in combination with the APatient Protection and Affordable Care Act@
(JCX-18-10), March 21, 2010, at 31-34.  (t\The JCT fails to call the penalty a Apenalty@ only in a 
heading.)  Not surprisingly, weeks after a number of states filed lawsuits to challenge the PPACA, 
the JCT amended this Technical Explanation, in Errata for JCX-18-10 (JCX-27-10), May 4, 2010, 
at 2, only then referring to the penalty as a Anew excise tax.@  Such after-the-fact Alegislative 
history@ is not indicative of the Congressional intent.  See, e.g., Gustafon v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 
561, 579 (1995) (AMaterial not available to the lawmakers is not considered, in the normal course, 
to be legislative history.  After-the-fact statements . . . are not a reliable indicator of what 
Congress intended when it passed the law.@); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass=n, 479 U.S. 388, 407 (1987) 
(Supreme Court gives little weight to legislative history entered 10 days after enactment of 
legislation); Cobell v. Nortoh, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Apost-enactment legislative 
history is not only oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight@). 
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Circuit has put it: 
“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion”. [Citations omitted].  Congress, 
by requiring remand in subpart (d)(3), obviously knew how to 
require it for (d)(2); it did not do so. That silence is deafening for 
purposes of our analysis. 
Garcia v. United States, 88 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173, (2001) (stating that this rule of statutory construction "is well settled").  
Likewise, Congress clearly knew how to characterize the enforcement mechanism as a tax, if it had 
wanted to.  Congress's silence - i.e., its complete failure to ever refer to the mandate enforcement 
mechanism as a "tax" in over two thousand pages of text - is deafening indeed, utterly drowning 
out Defendant's argument that the mandate enforcement mechanism is anything other than what 
Congress called it eighteen times:  a "penalty." 
Indeed, cases cited by Defendants do not support their spurious suggestion that the penalty 
is a tax.  Def. Mem. 28-31.  Both Barr v. United States, 736 F.2d 1134, 1135 (7th Cir. 1984), and 
Warren v. United States, 874 F.2d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 1989), involved efforts to enjoin collection of 
penalties directly assessed for failing properly to pay an undisputed tax: falsely claiming a 
withholding exemption in Barr, and refusing to sign a federal tax return in Warren.  Those 
penalties were essential to the collection of revenue (see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 
31-32 (1953), overruled in part on other grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 
(1968)), not extraneous to the government=s tax needs (Id. at 31), and clearly Asupportable as in aid 
of a revenue purpose@ (Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)).  Here, however, the 
penalty is not incidental to collecting a tax, but is a Ameans of enforcing . . . regulations@ that are 
Aextraneous to any tax need.@ See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513; Kahriger,, 345 U.S. at 31.  This 
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distinction is critical - as the courts often have recognized.  See, e.g., United States v. La Franca,
282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (Anotwithstanding they are called taxes, [they] are in their nature also 
penalties . . . the exaction here in question is not a true tax, but a penalty involving the idea of 
punishment for infraction of the law@); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child labor Tax Case),
259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922) (a tax may involve an incidental regulatory restraint but a penalty actually 
regulates).   Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994 (if primary purpose is regulatory, incidental revenue does 
not Amake the imposition a tax@); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (allowing 
challenge to penalties under Prohibition Act); Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386, 391-92 
(1922) (same); Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(analyzing whether provision was penalty or tax for AIA purposes).   
Defendants also cite the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1894) and Bd. of Trustees v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933), arguing that the Constitution=s apportionment requirements do 
not apply to penalties enacted under the commerce power.  Def. Mem. 55-57.  Of course, such 
penalties were not subject to appportionment because they were not taxes at all.  In the Head
Money Cases, Congress did not exercise its taxing power, but penalized Aincident to the regulation 
of commerce.@  112 U.S. at 595.  In Bd. of Trustees, the Supreme Court held that Acustoms 
duties@ were not subject to tax-limiting doctrines, because they also were imposed pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.  289 U.S. at 58-59.  The Rodgers Court held that revenues derived from 
penalties aimed at regulating interstate commerce Ado not divest the regulation of its commerce 
character and render it an exercise of the taxing power.@  138 F.2d at 995.  Defendants= argument 
demonstrates precisely why the mandate=s penalty is not a tax subject to the Anti-Injunction Act. 
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Defendants= reliance on Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974), also is 
misplaced.  Def. Mem. 12,30.  That case did not involve the critical distinction between a Atax@
and a Apenalty@ at issue here, but rather whether the AIA applied to a challenge involving the 
withdrawal of an entity=s tax-exempt status.  The Court itself noted that the suit was Aaimed at the 
imposition of federal income, FICA and FUTA taxes which clearly are intended to raise revenue.@
Id.  In contrast, the individual mandate is neither a regulatory or a revenue-raising tax at all, but a 
regulation enforced by a non-tax penalty. 
In short, Petitioners believe that the President of the United States, Congress and even the 
text of the Act itself are all correct:  the penalty is a penalty, not a tax.  Of course, the clearly 
established fact that the mandate is not a tax is important not only to standing under the 
Anti-Injunction Act, it also shows that the mandate is not valid as an exercise of Congress=s power 
to Alay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.@  We address that particular question 
in more depth infra.   
IV. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE EXCEEDS CONGRESS=S POWERS AND 
VIOLATES THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS AND CORE 
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM. 
By enacting the individual mandate, Congress has exceeded its legislative authority under 
Article I.  Neither its commerce and taxing powers, nor the Necessary and Proper Clause, affords 
Congress the power to coerce citizens B under threat of penalty B into the stream of commerce, 
thereby subjecting them to its regulation.  This unprecedented assertion of unbridled authority 
usurps powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, disparages the rights of other 
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citizens protected by the Ninth Amendment, and completely obliterates this Nation=s unique 
system of dual sovereignty. 
Because Article I provides no authority to Congress to enact the individual mandate, the 
power to make such individual healthcare insurance decisions rests with the States or individuals 
themselves.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the AUnited States is entirely a creature of the 
Constitution@ and Ait can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.@ Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (Black, J.) (plurality opinion).  Whatever 
authority the people refused to delegate to the federal government remained with them or their 
States.  This basic principle is enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which declares that all powers 
neither delegated to the federal government nor prohibited to the States Aare reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.@  Thus, as the Court noted in New York v. United States, the 
Constitution=s structures creates Aessentially a tautology . . . . The Tenth Amendment confirms that 
the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve 
power to the States.@ New York, 505 U.S. at 157. 
The Ninth Amendment complements recent cases recognizing limits on federal power, and 
itself calls into question the constitutionality of the individual mandate and other PPACA 
provisions.  The Supreme Court has recognized that the Ninth Amendment Aunambiguously 
refer[s] to individual rights.@ District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008).  
Here, the mandate clearly denies or disparages individual rights retained by the people, including 
their right to self-government through the States.  The Guarantee Clause further complements the 
Adual sovereignty@ in our constitutional system by directing the federal government to Aguarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.@  U.S. Const. art. IV, ' 4.  This 
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 38 of 95
22
guarantee operates alongside the Constitution=s principle of federalism to preserve the States and 
their independence from the federal government.  Each State Ais entitled to order the processes of 
its own governance.@ Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999).  AIndeed, having the power to 
make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature.@ FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982).  While the question of whether Guarantee Clause claims 
are justiciable was briefly noted in New York, 505 U.S. at 185, the Supreme Court nevertheless 
proceeded to analyze the challenged federal legislation under the clause, concluding that the clause 
was not violated there because ACongress offers the States a legitimate choice rather than issuing 
an unavoidable command.@ Id.  The same cannot be said here of the PPACA. 
The PPACA violates this constitutional system of dual sovereignty and federalist 
principles by eliminating the ability of individuals to make critical healthcare decisions for 
themselves (or through their States).  Because systemic safeguards in the Tenth Amendment, 
Article I, and the Guarantee Clause protect the States from precisely the kind of federal incursion 
attempted with the individual mandate and corresponding mandates on the States, the Act cannot 
be upheld. 
A. Every Act of Congress Must Have a Constitutional Source. 
The federal government is one of delegated, enumerated, and thus limited powers, as 
eloquently explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez:
We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal Government of 
enumerated powers.  As James Madison wrote, the powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.  This 
constitutionally mandated division of authority was adopted by the Framers to 
ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.  Just as the separation and 
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to 
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of 
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tyranny and abuse from either front. 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted).  See also 
M=Culloch, 17 U.S. at 405 (AThis government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated 
powers.  The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is now universally 
admitted.@).   It is axiomatic that Aour Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty 
between the states and the federal Government.@ See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 
(1991).  The Supreme Court recognized and affirmed this fundamental principle from the earliest 
days of the Republic, as Chief Justice Marshall famously observed: AThe powers of the legislature 
are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is 
written.@ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).  Our system of dual 
sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions, and not only those, like the Tenth 
Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly.  In fact, the concept of state sovereignty is implicit 
in the Constitution=s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only the few, 
discrete and enumerated ones contained in Article I, Section 8.  
It is an implication rendered express by the Tenth Amendment=s assertion that A[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.@  The Tenth Amendment affirms the 
undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the federal government is one of enumerated, hence 
limited, powers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 (Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (AThis government 
is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers@).  Powers not delegated to the federal 
government are reserved to the states or to the people.  
The structure of the Constitution reflects the federalist values of the document=s framers 
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 40 of 95
24
and is inconsistent with any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that would grant Congress 
unlimited power.  The framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon 
and through the states and instead designed a system in which the state and federal governments 
would exercise concurrent authority over the people, who were, in Alexander Hamilton=s words, 
Athe only proper objects of government.@  Accordingly, the federal government may act only 
where the Constitution authorizes it to do so.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992).  To ensure that these fundamental limits are applied, A[e]very law enacted by Congress 
must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.@ United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).  Article I begins:  AAll legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.@  U.S. Const. art. I, ' 1 (emphasis added).  The 
Commerce Clause obviously does not grant Congress the power to enact the individual health 
insurance mandate.  
B. The individual mandate is impermissible under the Commerce Clause. 
Congress=s power to regulate ACommerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes,@ U.S. Const. art. I, ' 8, has been the subject of litigation for 
close to two centuries.  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  What is clear from recent cases, however, is that, Aeven under our 
modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress=s regulatory authority is not 
without bounds.@ United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).  Further, in order for an 
activity to be the subject of regulation under the Commerce Clause, Ait must be some sort of 
economic endeavor,@ id. at 611 (emphasis added), not merely an economic decision.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may regulate the use of the channels of 
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interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though they may come only from intrastate activities, and Congress may even 
regulate activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.  United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  The vast array of economic activities subject to regulation have always 
been just that B activities.  The Court has never held that the Commerce Clause empowers 
Congress to regulate inactivity.  The PPACA does not merely purport to regulate how people buy 
health insurance, or the price they pay, or the terms of the contracts.  Instead, it does what 
Congress has never before dared to do B it mandates that individuals affirmatively engage in 
economic activity where they might otherwise choose not to. 
If the individual mandate of the PPACA is allowed to stand, it will open the door to a 
sweeping expansion of federal power.  In the future, Congress will not only be able to dictate the 
terms under which individuals purchase health insurance or health care services, but also details of 
a patient=s care, including preventative health procedures such as regular exercise and vitamin 
supplements.  If Congress can compel one sort of economic activity that is seen as desirable for 
the public good, why not another?  Ultimately, if Congress were deemed to have Constitutional 
power to compel the purchase of goods and services, there could be no principled limit to such a 
power.
It is axiomatic Constitutional law that Congress has only specific, enumerated powers, and 
that the police power is reserved to the states.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; see also United States v. 
Comstock, 560 U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 176 L. Ed. 2d 878 (2010).  In order to find ' 1501 to be 
within the bounds of Congress=s powers under the Commerce Clause, it would be necessary to 
depart from this settled principle of law, and A[p]ile inference upon inference that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
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retained by the States.@ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
Interestingly, both the Petitioners and the Defendants rely on the Supreme Court=s most 
recent Commerce Clause case, Gonazles v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  Raich provides no support 
for the Defendants= position and in fact demonstrates that Congress=s power under the Commerce 
Clause is limited to the regulation of voluntary economic activity. 
In Raich the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had the power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate the purely local cultivation and use of marijuana.  Id. at 5.  
Distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that in those cases, the activities which 
Congress had impermissibly sought to regulate (possession of firearms near a school in Lopez and 
gender-motivated violence in Morrison) were fundamentally non-economic in nature and thus 
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 24-25.  In contrast, the Court concluded that 
the cultivation of marijuana was in fact economic in nature, and thus local cultivation and 
consumption were subject to regulation where it was part of a larger scheme to regulate interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 22.  (AThat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no 
moment.  As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that 
larger scheme.@)
Yet the Defendants make an unprecedented inferential leap from the conclusion in Raich to 
the conclusion that Congress can compel Petitioners to purchase a package of goods and services 
they neither want nor need.  Def. Mem. 25-26.  Such an inference is untenable.  It is 
undoubtedly true that the purchase of health insurance and other goods and services related to 
health care are economic activity as contemplated by Raich.  There is nothing in Raich, however, 
nor in any other precedent, to support the radical proposition that Congress may compel anyone to 
engage in such economic activity. 
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Defendants contend that individuals who choose to remain rationally uninsured while 
young and healthy are Afree riders,@ because they choose not to engage in the economic activity of 
purchasing health insurance they do not believe they need.  This accusation betrays Constitutional 
infirmity of the PPACA.  Congress seeks to legislate far beyond its rightful Constitutional 
authority in order to compel rational economic actors B individual citizens B to behave in a manner 
they have concluded is not in their best interests.  Fortunately, the Constitution provides limits on 
the powers of the national government and a means of enforcing those limits. 
Defendants= position that the individual mandate is a valid exercise of Congress=s
commerce power depends entirely upon the incredible contention that inactivity B the failure to 
have healthcare insurance B constitutes economic activity in the form of a Avolitional economic 
decision@ itself subject to federal regulation.  Def. Mem. 27-28.  But no court ever has upheld so 
sweeping an assertion of federal power.  To do so would arm Congress with unbridled top-down 
control over virtually every aspect of persons= lives, as consumers and producers, and destroy this 
nation=s defining legacy of dual sovereignty, thereby transforming our federal government from 
one of limited, enumerated powers into one of limitless authority over states and their citizens.  
Nowhere in the historical record is there any indication whatsoever that the Framers of the 
Constitution ever contemplated the federal government having the power under the Commerce 
Clause B or any other clause B to compel a citizen to purchase a good or service from another 
citizen or private entity. 
The mandatory insurance purchasing provision and enforcement mechanism at issue in this 
matter establish the kind of national police power the United States Supreme Court has always 
rejected. AAs the courts have always recognized, the text of the Constitution does not grant 
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Congress a general >police power= to pass any legislation it may deem to be in the public interest.  
Instead, the Constitution confines Congress to its enumerated powers and allows it to execute 
those powers by means of laws that are >necessary and proper.=@  Randy E. Barnett, Is the 
Rehnquist Court an AActivist Court?  The Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1275, 
1281 (2002). See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (Thomas, J. concurring.)  
(AAlthough we supposedly applied the substantial effects test for the past 60 years, we always have 
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit 
Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal 
power,@ citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
ABy assigning the Federal Government power over >certain enumerated objects only,= the 
Constitution >leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects.=  The Federalist No. 39 (J. Madison).  The purpose of this design is to preserve the 
>balance of power between the States and the Federal Government . . . [that] protect[s] our 
fundamental liberties.=@ United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ____,130 S. Ct. at 1982 (Thomas J., 
dissenting) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 572 
(Powell, J. dissenting)). 
To reach its conclusion that the individual mandate scheme is permissible and that the 
Petitioners= complaint should be dismissed outright, Defendants twists a pretzel out of the 
enumerated interstate commerce power B one where marketplace inactivity becomes marketplace 
activity in order to justify the exercise of an obvious police power to compel individual, private 
conduct.  As such, Defendants seeks not the appropriate use of its police power but, instead, 
unfettered police power, the limits of which Defendants themselves cannot even define. 
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C. Congress=s Commerce power does not reach inactivity. 
The Constitution gives Congress the power A[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes[,]@ U.S. Const., Art. I, ' 8, effectively 
allowing it to superintend the Nation=s commercial and economic activities.  However, its power 
to regulate activity does not permit Congress to forbid inactivity.  Congress may not order 
inactive Americans to buy, sell, manufacture, grow, or distribute any product or service against 
their will.  According to the CBO, no federal court ever has upheld such a limitless exercise of the 
commerce power:  AThe government has never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.@  Robert Hartman & Paul Van de Water, AThe 
Budgetary Treatment of an individual mandate to Buy Health Insurance,@ CBO Memo., at 1, 
August 1994. 
In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court identified three broad categories 
of activities that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.  
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress=s commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce . . . . 
Id. at 558-59 (emphasis added).  Applying these principles, the Court held that A[t]he possession 
of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition 
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.@ Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court applied the same 
three-category analysis and struck down the challenged provision of the Violence Against Women 
Act because A[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
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activity. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).  It concluded;  AWe accordingly reject the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct=s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.@ Id. at 617 (emphasis added). 
It bears emphasizing that the conduct at issue in Lopez and Morrison, although 
non-economic and unreachable under the Commerce Clause, was nonetheless activity voluntarily 
engaged in by the parties.  In this key respect, the inactivity which Congress here seeks to regulate 
is even further removed from its legitimate commerce power. 
Defendants rely heavily on Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).  However, both cases upheld regulation of economic activity. In Raich, the 
Court=s most recent Commerce Clause decision, it upheld application of the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical 
purposes because those activities were economic in character and, at least in the aggregate, had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce:  
Our case law firmly establishes Congress= power to regulate purely local activities
that are part of an economic Aclass of activities@ that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. . . . As we stated in Wickard, >even if appellee=s activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its 
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce= . . . . When Congress decides that the >total incidence= of a 
practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. 
Id. at 26 (emphasis added) (citing Wickard, in which the Court held that the activity of growing 
wheat for personal consumption was subject to regulation).  The Raich Court, in discussing how 
the CSA Adirectly regulates economic, commercial activity,@ defined the term Aeconomics@ to refer 
to Athe production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.@  545 U.S. at 17.  In every 
respect B whether one is making, transferring, or using a good of service B economics refers to 
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activity, not inactivity.  Indeed, in the absence of activity, the term would be devoid of meaning. 
In fact, the Asubstantial economic effect@ Commerce Clause cases since Jones & Laughlin 
Steel consistently refer only to Aactivities.@ See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 
37 (Aintrastate activities, by reason of close and intimate relation to interstate commerce, may fall 
within federal control@); Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (Athose activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end@); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 
U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (Aintrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the 
exercise of the granted power@); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (Aeven if appellee=s activity be local, and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce@); Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 
(Aactivities affecting commerce@); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (Athree broad categories of activity that 
Congress may regulate under its commerce power@); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 698 (Athree broad 
categories of activity@) (quoting Lopez); Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (Aactivities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.@). Consequently, in order to render conduct unlawful under the Commerce 
Clause, Congress must be regulating interstate commerce, not merely inactivity.  Congress 
cannot, under the guise of regulating interstate commerce, legislate beyond its delegated authority. 
And Congress=s regulation of intrastate activity must reach activity that has a real and Asubstantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.@  See Perez, 402 U.S. at 152 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. 
at 125).  The individual mandate to purchase insurance, discussed infra, goes well beyond the 
bounds of the Commere Clause.   
Ironically, Defendants cannot help but use the words Aactivities,@ Aactivity,@ and Aconduct,@
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Def. Mem. 16-19; 24-28, in searching for support.  They completely misread Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), as 
supporting their position.  But both cases involved commercial establishments offering goods or 
services to the public:  an inn Aserv[ing] interstate travelers@ in Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261; 
a restaurant Aoffer[ing] . . . food [that] has moved in commerce@ in Daniel, 395 U.S. at 304.  As 
stated in State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., neither case fairly can be read 
to permit Congress to require activity by someone who is inactive.  In both instances, the 
defendants could have opted not to engage in any commerce; it was their own commercial activity 
which subjected them to congressional regulation: 
There are several obvious ways in which Heart of Atlanta and 
Wickard differ markedly from this case, but I will only focus on 
perhaps the most significant one: the motel owner and the farmer 
were each involved in an activity (regardless of whether it could 
readily be deemed interstate commerce) and each had a choice to 
discontinue that activity. . . . Those cases, in other words, involved 
activities in which the plaintiffs had chosen to engage. All Congress 
was doing was saying that if you choose to engage in the activity of 
operating a motel or growing wheat, you are engaging in interstate 
commerce and subject to federal authority 
State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2010 WL 4010119 at *34.  Congress 
was not regulating whether or not to serve food or provide lodging, merely regulating how those 
activities could be carried out.  Thus, the Lopez Court itself cited Heart of Atlanta Motel as a case 
Awhere we have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.@ Lopez,
514 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added). 
D. The individual mandate does not regulate commerce, it compels commerce. 
The individual mandate does not regulate economic activity, but compels it by forcing 
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individuals who lack a congressionally dictated level of healthcare coverage B particularly those 
who would not qualify for Medicaid even under the Act=s greatly expanded eligibility criteria B
into the insurance market.  In this crucial respect, the mandate is unlike any legislation ever 
upheld under the Commerce Clause. 
Defendants assert that not having insurance is reachable under the commerce power 
because it is an Aeconomic decision.@  But a decision is purely a mental process which may, or 
may not, result in activity (economic or otherwise), depending on the decision.  A decision to do 
nothing does not covert nothing to something.  Zero multiplied by any number still equals zero.  
Defendants cannot fill that void with references to congressional concern over Amarket timing@ and 
Apremium spirals.@  Def. Mem. 25-26.  Under Defendants= logic, any failure to buy B or sell B
particular goods or services is both a regulable prelude to future economic activity and a decision 
Congress can reach because it impacts the existing marketplace.6  Thus, the continued ownership 
of a home is transformed into a Adecision@ not to sell, which then can be characterized as an 
Aeconomic activity,@ which Congress therefore can mandate.  Such logic, which leads to an 
infinite commerce power, finds no support in any case decision. 7
Moreover, Congress=s conclusion Athat a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so . . . .@ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2.  This is Aultimately 
6 Defendants cannot settle on a consistent alchemy to transform inactivity into 
activity.  At times, they contend that the decision not to buy insurance is a properly regulable 
Avolitional event,@ Def. Mem. 24-28; but at other times they imply that a presumed later use of 
healthcare services renders a current failure to buy insurance regulable acitvity, Id. at 24-28.  
Both positions are nonsensical. 
7 Indeed, even in industries such as securities trading, where Congress presumably 
could preempt State regulation, the power to regulate commerce never has been construed to allow 
Congress to compel inactive individuals to purchase stocks or bonds. 
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a judicial rather than a legislative question,@ id., and the Supreme Court has expressed concern 
over any instance in which Congress piles Ainference upon inference@ as a basis Ato convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained 
by the States.@ Id. at 567.  See also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) 
(Kennedy, J. concurring) (AThe rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a 
demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration.@).  Here, Congress only can connect 
an individual=s lack of healthcare insurance with the supposed need for the mandate to regulate 
interstate insurance markets through a series of unsubstantiated and unquantifiable inferences and 
assumptions, some expressed and other implied (even if unacknowledged), about human behavior 
and its effects.8  This attenuated chain simply is too long and fragile to constitute the Asubstantial
relation to interstate commerce@ required by Lopez.
More fundamentally, accepting Defendants= position would make it impossible to maintain 
any outer limits on the commerce power.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.  It would permit Congress, 
upon the flimsiest of nexuses, itself to manufacture the basis on which it can regulate anyone at any 
time.  Such a ruling would transform our nation beyond recognition.  The Commerce Clause 
makes no distinction between one type of economic activity and another.  Nor does it distinguish 
between demand (buying) and supply (producing and selling) activities.  Every decision 
individuals make, at some remote level of analysis, can be said to have economic purposes or 
8 These include assumptions that:  (1) everyone at some point in life will consume 
healthcare services; (2) to save money, some persons who can afford healthcare insurance decide 
not to buy it; (3) some of these persons will not pay for healthcare services they consume; (4) some 
of these persons get away without being pursued for payment by their healthcare providers, who 
instead pass the costs on to other patients, providers, and insurers; (5) this passing on increases the 
aggregate cost of healthcare services, driving up the cost of insurance premiums; (6) the Act will 
drive up premium costs (especially by its requirement that insurers ignore preexisting conditions); 
and (7) the Individual Mandate will reduce premiums costs. 
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consequences.
If Congress can compel Americans to buy healthcare insurance, then it can compel them to 
buy B or to make or sell B any good or service, based on a finding that such compulsion will assist 
its efforts to achieve some desired Aeconomic@ result.  Congress could force citizens to buy 
government-acquired manufacturers= cars and government-rescued banks= financial instruments, 
or to work in any industry and on whatever terms it chooses.  Even in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), in which the Court abandoned its earlier efforts to restrict New 
Deal legislation, it warned that a Congress armed with excessive powers under the Commerce 
Clause would threaten our system of federalism and bring about Aa completely centralized 
government.@ Id. at 37 (and quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557).  The PPACA underscores the 
prescience of that warning. 
V. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION=S NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. 
Defendants turn to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Alast, best hope of those who 
defend ultra vires Congressional action.@ Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).  But 
that clause cannot rescue the individual mandate, because it is not a means of implementing a 
constitutionally enumerated power and it fails under the considerations recently described by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock. 
A. The power that the individual mandate seeks to harness is simply without 
prior precedent, and the Necessary and Proper Clause does not create this 
power in and of itself. 
This issue was recently addressed in-depth by the court in State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Svcs.  In ruling against the Defendants, the court stated bluntly that "this is not 
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even a close call."  In so doing, the court found: 
At this stage in the litigation, this is not even a close call. I have read 
and am familiar with all the pertinent Commerce Clause cases, from 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824), to 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 
(2005). I am also familiar with the relevant Necessary and Proper 
Clause cases, from M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), to United States v. Comstock, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 
1949, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010). This case law is instructive, but 
ultimately inconclusive because the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause have never been applied in such a 
manner before. The power that the individual mandate seeks to 
harness is simply without prior precedent. 
State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2010 WL 4010119 at *34 (N. D. Fla.).  
While it is true that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to pass laws 
in furtherance of constitutionally-enumerated powers, it has also been settled since McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), that the clause may not substitute for powers the Constitution 
denied Congress, or empower Congress to violate rights otherwise protected by the Constitution, 
e.g., by the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth amendments: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 
Id. at 421 (emphasis added).  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J. concurring) (McCulloch=s limits 
of Congress=s power under the clause Aare not merely hortatory@).
A[I]n determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative 
authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means 
that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.@
Comstock,  130 S. Ct. at 1956 (emphasis added).  The clause only allows Congress authority to 
enact a statute that is Alegitimately predicated on an enumerated power[,]@ and only so long as the 
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relationship between the statute as the means and the enumerated power as the end is Anot too 
attenuated.@ Id. at 1963-64. 
The individual mandate does not implement or effectuate any enumerated power.  
Congress seeks coverage for uninsured Americans by ordering everyone to be covered.  The Act=s
ultimate goal (universal coverage) and the substance of its mandate (requiring all to get coverage) 
are the same.  The mandate is not a means to the exercise of an enumerated power, but an end and 
a novel exercise of power to compel the American people.  Significantly, in those rare instances in 
which Congress has imposed affirmative obligations on persons based solely upon their being 
citizens or residents, it has done so not by claiming expanded power over commerce or general 
health and welfare B much less by invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause B but based on 
explicit constitutional authority.  See, e.g., Selective Service Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 383, 390 (1918) 
(conscription into armed services justified by power Ato raise and support Armies@ under U.S. 
Const. art. I, ' 8, cl. 12); Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff=d, 275 F.3d 
45 (5th Cir. 2001),  cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1135 (2002) (compelling answers to census questions 
justified by U.S. Const. art. I, ' 2, cl. 3).  The Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent
source of authority for such a policy goal, and therefore cannot validate the individual mandate.  
B. The individual mandate fails under the Comstock factors. 
Comstock clearly underscores that the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot save the 
mandate.  Examination of the five Aconsiderations@ relied on by the Court, in determining that the 
clause permitted the civil commitment of sexually dangerous former federal inmates, confirms that 
the individual mandate B unlike the law at issue in Comstock B is by no means a Adiscreet and 
narrow exercise of authority over a small class of persons already subject to the federal power.@
130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J. concurring).   
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First, the relevant enactment must be a rational means to implement an otherwise proper 
exercise of an enumerated power, not an end in itself.  Id. at 1956.  But, as explained above, the 
individual mandate is not a means to a proper end.  It stands alone as the Act=s unseverable 
centerpiece, from which the other provisions flow. 
Second, in sharp contrast to the long federal history (more than 150 years) of enacting and 
enforcing criminal laws, detaining prisoners, and providing them with mental health services 
present in Comstock, Congress has no history of directing Americans= individual healthcare or 
insurance decisions.  Any authority for such requirements resides solely in the States as 
sovereigns, as part of that general police power Awhich the State[s] did not surrender when 
becoming member[s] of the Union under the Constitution.@ Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 
11, 25, (1905).9
Comstock turned in large part on the historical fact that the federal role in establishing a 
prison system in America enjoyed ancient roots.  Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer relied 
on a Alongstanding federal statutory framework, which had been in place since 1855.@ Comstock,
2010 WL 1946729, at *10.  This deep tradition of federal involvement in establishing a penal 
system weighed in favor of the statute at issue.  Defendants in turn argue that Athe Supreme Court 
has long recognized Congress=s power to regulate in this area.@  Def. Mem. 19-20.  The settled 
historical record, however, is that Congress's involvement in healthcare is rather short compared to 
the lengthy history of federal involvement at issue in Comstock:  AFederal involvement in health 
9 Significantly, past mandates requiring citizens to have insurance have been 
grounded in the States= police powers.  See Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) (automobile 
insurance).  This also is true of the individual mandate enacted by Massachusetts B Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 111M, ' 2 (2008); see also Fountas v. Comm=r of Dep=t of Rev., 2009 WL 3792468 
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009), aff=d, 922 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) B which Congress 
admittedly emulated here.  See PPACA ' 1501(a)(2)(D). 
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 55 of 95
39
is a fairly new occurrence in U.S. history.@ Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld, The Changing Federal 
Role in U.S. Health Care Policy, 67 (Praeger Publishers, 1997) (emphasis added).  AWhile a few 
laws and special concerns were passed prior to the twentieth century, the bulk of the federal health 
legislation that has health impact . . . has actually been passed in the past 50 or so years.@ Id.
Indeed, modern healthcare in the United States Aoccupies a completely different place in the 
economy, in the mind of the public, and in its impact on the government at all levels than it did 100 
years ago, at the beginning of the twentieth century, or at the beginning of the country in the late 
1700s, when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.@ Id. at 1. 
Defendants concede that the earliest congressional legislation affecting the Abusiness of 
insurance@ was passed within only the last thirty-six years.  Based on this paltry legislative 
pedigree, Defendants purport to rely on a Ahistory@ of federal regulation of the health insurance 
market.  Def. Mem. 19-20.  In marked contrast, however, Comstock relied on a Alongstanding
federal statutory framework, which had been in place since 1855,@ just threescore and eight years 
after the constitution was ratified.  Comstock, 2010 WL 1946729, at *10.   
More importantly, ' 1501 of the PPACA does not regulate health insurance providers.  
Instead, as the Defendants must concede, the provision applies only to individuals.  In other 
words, the PPACA seeks to regulate uninsured people who, by definition, have no connection with 
health insurance providers.  Whatever the recent history of federal regulation of the health 
insurance industry, the history of the federal government=s forcing uninsured Americans to 
purchase health policies is nonexistent.  Consistent with Comstock, the lack of any significant or 
meaningful historical anchor for the novel power attempted by the PPACA weighs heavily against 
the Defendants= claim of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
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Third, no sound reason exists for the individual mandate in light of Congress=s lack of 
authority to compel commerce, whether in regulating insurance, healthcare, or any other industry 
or field of endeavor.  Compelling activity differs fundamentally from simply regulating a market. 
Fourth, the Comstock Court made clear that any exercise of power supportable under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause must be consistent with the Constitution=s federal architecture, and 
reaffirmed that the clause does not Aconfer on Congress a general Apolice power which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States . . . .@ Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1964.  But, far from Aproperly account[ing] for state interests,@ id. at 1962, the individual mandate 
can only be imposed through exercise of a police power, and it shreds the traditional federalism 
guaranteed by Tenth Amendment.  As shown below, the federal government has no right to 
compel the States to commit their resources to accommodate the added costs stemming from the 
individual mandate or from the PPACA=s unprecedented expansion of Medicaid, its insurance 
exchanges and reinsurance requirements, and its expensive employer coverage provisions.  See
Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24 (AWhen a law . . . violates the principle of state sovereignty . . . it is not 
a law . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause.@). Thus, the PPACA Ainvade[s]
state sovereignty [and] improperly limit[s] the scope of >powers that remain with the States.@=
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962. 
Comstock hinged on the Supreme Court=s assurance that the federal statute at issue 
Aproperly accounts for state interests.@ Comstock, 2010 WL 1946729, at *11.  In its analysis of 
the federal civil commitment statute, Comstock detailed the myriad ways in which the federal 
government was required to cooperate with and defer to the state during the custody or transfer of 
each federal prisoner.  By requiring federal authorities to relinquish federal authority over the 
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 57 of 95
41
prisoner whenever a state asserted its own, the statute deferred to the state=s desire to take control 
of the prisoner.  Id. at *12.  Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer emphasized that the statute at 
issue did not Ainvade state sovereignty or otherwise improperly limit the powers that remain with 
the States,@ but rather required accommodation of state interests when facilitating the custody and 
transfer of a federal prisoner.  Id. at *11-12.  In part due to its accommodation of state interests, 
the statute in Comstock was upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate exercise of federal power. 
Concurring with the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to caution that A[i]t is of 
fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are 
compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that 
is a factor suggesting that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.@ Id. at
*18 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (emphasis added).  Because the statute at issue did Anot supersede 
the right and responsibility of the States@ and Ainvolve[d] little intrusion upon the ordinary 
processes and powers of the States,@ Justice Kennedy agreed that the federal civil commitment 
statute was a Anecessary and proper@ exercise of congressional authority. 
Unlike the statute at issue in Comstock, the PPACA's individual mandate fails entirely to 
accommodate state interests.  The PPACA gives the federal government sole authority to penalize 
individuals for choosing not to obtain health insurance B in direct contravention of Constitutional 
authority.  Rather than cooperate with or defer to individuals= choices, the PPACA irreconcilably 
collides with liberty.  The PPACA contains neither a severability provision nor a provision 
allowing individual states to opt out of ' 1501.  Nor does it authorize the federal government to 
relinquish control of health insurance coverage over to the states when asked to do so.  
Accordingly, it cannot be said to accommodate state interests in any way.  Consistent with 
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Comstock, the PPACA=s failure to accommodate state interests weighs heavily against Defendants=
claim of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Fifth, the individual mandate is not narrow in scope like the law upheld in Comstock, but 
threatens to bring about fundamental and unprecedented change by centralizing top-down 
economic power in Congress.10  The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot serve as a bootstrap by 
which Congress may evade the constitutional limits on its enumerated powers.   
In upholding Congress=s civil-commitment power, Comstock emphasized that the federal 
statute at issue was a Anarrowly tailored means of pursuing the Government=s legitimate interest.@
Comstock, 2010 WL 1946729, at *14.  Importantly, the Comstock statute was Anarrow in scope,@
Aapplied to only a small fraction of federal prisoners,@ and its reach was Alimited to individuals 
already in the custody of the Federal Government.@ Id. at *2.  Unlike Comstock, the PPACA is 
not Aa discrete and narrow exercise of authority over a small class of persons.@ Id. at *19 
(Kennedy, J. concurring). 
The PPACA cannot possibly be said to be narrowly tailored or Anarrow in scope.@  Rather, 
the PPACA seeks to force every uninsured American, under pain of monetary penalty, to purchase 
private health insurance.  This sweeping individual mandate applies to the rich and the poor, the 
young and the old, and the healthy and the sick alike.  Defendants insist that healthcare is unique 
since everyone will need to purchase medical services at some point, Def. Mem. 24-26, but this 
10 Defendants assert a need for such sweeping new power, but ignore other avenues 
for Congress to achieve universal coverage through legitimate exercise of its enumerated powers, 
such as tax incentives, or laws encouraging or requiring payment for services rendered, all creating 
stronger incentives for uninsured persons to choose to buy coverage.  Moreover, any relation the 
mandate may have to the exercise of Aan enumerated Article I power@ is far Atoo attenuated@ for 
Necessary and Proper Clause purposes.  Id. at 1963 (quoting Lopex, 514 U.S. at 567).  As 
explained above, the mandate is separated by many degrees of speculation and inference from any 
enumerated power. 
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argument only further exposes that the PPACA=s reach is truly unlimited and not narrowly 
tailored.  Indeed, based on the Defendants= position, there would be absolutely no principled rule 
by which individuals retain a right to be left alone with respect to any subject susceptible to 
economic regimentation nor would there be any possible way to say that any power of economic 
regulation remained to the States to the exclusion of the federal government.  Consequently, such 
a result cannot be rooted in the Constitution. 
Defendants argues that the individual mandate is Aessential@ to the overall health care 
reform.  Def. Mot. at 21-24.  That may or may not be true; even supporters of the health care 
reform see alternatives to the individual mandate.  See, e.g., States Argue the Feds Can=t Force 
Purchase of Health Insurance, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2010, at A20 (A[W]hile the goal of the 
mandate is crucial to reform, the mandate isn=t the only way to achieve that goal.@).  Regardless, 
the real question is whether Congress has the power in the first place to do what it is doing.  That 
a statutory provision may be Aessential@ to some end is irrelevant to the question of whether the end 
itself is constitutional.  Raich does not stand for the broad proposition that Congress is free to pass 
otherwise unconstitutional laws by somehow connecting them to a larger regulatory program.  
Instead, Congress=s ability to regulate commerce B using the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
execute Commerce Clause powers B extends to intrastate non-economic activity only insofar as 
failure to regulate such activity would undercut a broad federal regulatory scheme.  Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2005).   
Neither Raich nor Wickard authorized Congress to regulate non-activity.  AWhen the 
inquiry is whether a federal law has sufficient links to an enumerated power to be within the scope 
of federal authority, the analysis depends not on the number of links in the congressional-power 
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chain but on the strength of the chain.@ Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 900 (Kennedy, 
J. concurring, slip op. at 1).  Here Congress is not merely attempting to regulate local economic 
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects commercial markets nationwide.  Instead, it 
claims the authority to force individuals not engaged in economic activity to become engaged: 
[I]n this case we are dealing with something very different. The 
individual mandate applies across the board. People have no choice 
and there is no way to avoid it. Those who fall under the individual 
mandate either comply with it, or they are penalized. It is not based 
on an activity that they make the choice to undertake. Rather, it is 
based solely on citizenship and on being alive.  
State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2010 WL 4010119 *35 (emphasis 
added).  Because the power claimed here would alter the federal structure of the Constitution by 
creating an unlimited power indistinguishable from a national police power, it cannot be a proper 
use of the Necessary and Proper Clause.   
 Under the view advanced by the Defendants, the combination of the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause would render the rest of Congress=s enumerated Article I powers 
superfluous.  In contrast to the statute upheld in Comstock, the PPACA is simply Atoo sweeping in 
its scope.@ Comstock, 2010 WL 1946729, at *13.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court understands 
that Athere are . . . restraints upon the Necessary and Proper Clause authority.  As Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote in McCullough v. Maryland, even when the end is constitutional and legitimate, 
the means must be Aappropriate@ and Aplainly adapted@ to that end.  Moreover, they may not be 
otherwise Aprohibited@ and must be Aconsistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.@
These phrases are not merely hortatory.  For example, cases such as Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) affirm that a law is not 
Aproper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause [w]hen [it] violates [a constitutional] 
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principle of state sovereignty@ Printz, supra, at 923-924; see also New York, supra, at 166; Raich,
at 39 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
Thus, the question for this Court is not whether a private individual=s inactivity evidenced 
by not purchasing health insurance is Acommerce@ or even Asubstantially affects commerce@ under 
the Commerce Clause as Defendants wrongly argue.  Also, the question is not whether 
compelling an individual to purchase an insurance policy as required by the PPACA is necessary 
to the successful implementation of the PPACA. Simply put, the real question is whether it is 
appropriate and plainly adapted to an enumerated federal power for the federal government to 
require an individual to purchase a good or service from another individual or private entity for any 
purpose regardless of whether or not that purpose is necessary for carrying into execution a broad 
federal government program.  It is clear that Congress had numerous constitutional ways to 
legislate a health care regime that would have achieved its intended purposes.  The individual 
mandate was not one of them.  Rather than damage permanently our constitutional construct by 
unleashing both intended and unintended consequences that fundamentally alter the nature of this 
Republic, Congress must be required to consider legislative alternatives that do no violence to the 
Constitution, yet advance its policy and political objectives. 
In sum, absent a legitimate anchor to an enumerated congressional power under the 
Constitution, Defendants cannot rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to vindicate the 
individual mandate.  Because, after Comstock, only narrow, limited, and deeply historical claims 
of congressional power will be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause, ' 1501 of the 
PPACA cannot survive scrutiny.  The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot confer on Congress a 
vast, new power to legislate its desired end whenever it chooses to wave the commerce flag. 
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VI. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER THE TAXING 
AND SPENDING CLAUSE. 
Defendants argue in the alternative that even if the mandate to purchase insurance under '
1501 is not a permissible exercise of Congress=s power under the Commerce Clause, it is valid as 
an exercise of Congress=s power to Alay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.@  U.S. 
Const. art. I, ' 8.  Def. Mem. 28-31.  This argument is unavailing. 
A. Congress did not purport to pass the individual mandate pursuant to the 
Constitution=s taxing power. 
Importantly, Congress did not purport to pass the mandate to purchase insurance pursuant 
to the taxing power.  The Supreme Court has given weight to what power Congress purports to 
exercise when it enacts legislation.  In Sozinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), the Court 
considered whether provisions of the National Firearms Act that provided for confiscatory 
taxation of certain classes of firearms was a valid exercise of the taxing power.  Concluding that, 
on its face, the National Firearms Act appeared to be a valid tax, the Court held that it would not 
look behind Congress=s purported exercise of the taxing power.  Id. at 513.  The import of this 
case is that courts should not lightly disregard Congress=s purported motive in passing a piece of 
legislation which appears valid on its face.  Here, ' 1501 does not purport to be a tax.  If 
anything, Sozinsky supports the proposition that the Court should not ignore Congress=s claim that 
the mandate is an exercise of power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 
But even if the Court were to conclude that it should analyze the mandate to purchase 
insurance as if Congress had passed it pursuant to the taxing power, it would still be invalid.  
Unlike the statute in Sozinsky, the statute here is not valid on its face.  The Supreme Court=s
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opinion in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), is instructive.  There, an employer had 
been assessed a 10% tax on its annual profits because it had employed a worker younger than 
fourteen during the year.  Id.  at 34.  The Court found that the statute in question was not on its 
face a valid exercise of the taxing power.  Id. at 44.  The court considered several features of the 
statute in reaching its conclusion.  First, the Court found that it Aprovides a heavy exaction for a 
departure from a detailed course of conduct in business.@ Id. at 36.  Next, the Court found it 
significant that Athe amount [was] not to be proportioned in any degree to the extent or frequency 
of the departures, but [was] to be paid by the employer in full measure whether he employs five  
hundred children for a year, or employs only one for a day.@ Id. Other factors were the presence 
of a scienter requirement, where the violation had to be Aknowing@ and that the factory was subject 
to inspection by the relevant regulatory authority.  Id.  at 37. 
The features of the mandate to purchase insurance under ' 1501 are strikingly similar.  By 
calling the mandate a penalty, Congress has made it abundantly clear that its goal is to compel a 
particular course of conduct.  Further, the penalty is not proportional to the measure of the 
violation B it is a flat penalty.  It has no relationship to the cost the citizen would have to pay to 
purchase the requisite insurance.  It is assessed irrespective of the number of months during the 
year an individual is without insurance.  These striking similarities between the statute at issue in 
the Child Labor Tax Case and the insurance mandate of the PPACA demonstrate that the mandate 
is not a valid exercise of the taxing power on its face.   
If Congress could pass a statute which imposes a monetary penalty in the guise of a tax on 
persons who fail to affirmatively act by purchasing health insurance, what principled limit could 
then be imposed on such a power?  The General Welfare clause would become the new 
Commerce Clause by which Congress could presumably assess many penalties against Americans 
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for failing to obtain annual physicals, to take preventative medications, or to undertake virtually 
any other activity that could potentially interfere with a physician=s independent judgment or 
assessment of a patient.  Although Congress=s power to Alay and collect taxes@ is broad, Congress 
cannot thwart Article I limitations and broaden that power simply by tucking a penalty into a 
regulatory law: 
If, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states= reserved 
jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and 
spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, clause 1 of section 8 of 
article 1 would become the instrument for total subversion of the governmental 
powers reserved to the individual states. 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 75 (1936); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 216-17 (O=Connor, J. 
dissenting) (Taxing and Spending Clause limits in Butler Aremain sound@).
Although taxes may have a regulatory effect, the Court has invalidated A[p]enalty 
provisions in tax statutes added for breach of a regulation concerning activities in themselves 
subject only to state regulation.@ Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31 (citing Bailey, 259 U.S. at 34, 38).  In 
Bailey, the Court struck down, as an improper use of Congress=s taxing authority, a regulation 
incorporated a 10 percent tax on employers for use of child labor. Id. at 34.  The decision 
distinguished permissible uses of the taxing power that serve legitimate tax purposes (a strong 
regulatory aim also may be present) from taxes added to otherwise impermissible regulations as 
penalties B the Aso-called tax as a penalty.@ Id. at 36.11
Sonzinsky, on which Defendants rely, is not to the contrary.  Def. Mem. 30.  There, the 
Court upheld an annual federal tax on certain firearms dealers, explaining that A[o]n its face it is 
11 Although the Court later upheld Bailey-type labor regulations under the Commerce 
Clause (see, e.g., Darby), it has consistently reaffirmed Bailey=s Taxing and Spending Clause 
limiting principle.  See, e.g., Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31-32. 
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only a taxing measure@ that was not Aattended by an offensive regulation.@ Sonzinski, 300 U.S. at 
513-514.  The Court refused to infer a nefarious congressional motive to avoid otherwise 
applicable constitutional limitations on federal power.  Id. at 514.  However, the Court B as if to 
distinguish the PPACA B made clear that it was not dealing with a case Awhere the statute contains 
regulatory provisions related to a purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in 
other cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing the regulations.@ Id. at 
513.12
Similarly, United States v. Butler (also relied on by Defendants) makes clear that Congress 
cannot avoid limits on its powers simply by denominating a penalty, designed to enforce otherwise 
impermissible regulations, as a Atax.@  The Court referenced Bailey (The Child Labor Tax Case)
and Hill v. Wallace, noting that the laws at issue there Apurported to be taxing measures,@ but really 
were meant to regulate conduct not otherwise subject to the commerce or any other enumerated 
power with Athe levy of the tax a means to force compliance.@ Butler, 297 U.S. at 70.13  This was 
12 In Defendants= other cases taxes were sustained because their regulatory 
mechanisms supported revenue collection.  See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) 
(special taxes imposed on marijuana imports, production, and sales); United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919) (same with respect to opiates and coca derivatives); License Tax Cases, 72 
U.S. 462 (1866) @license@ requirements taxes because federal government lacked power to 
authorize licensed activity).  In all of these cases, the test of a valid tax Ais whether on its face the 
tax operates as a revenue generating measure and the attendant regulations are in aid of a revenue 
purpose.@ United States v. Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 868 
(1972), cited in United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2009). 
13
Butler also considered and rejected the same argument Defendants advance here 
based on the General Welfare Clause.  See 297 U.S. at 68.  Although the power to provide for the 
general welfare is an Aindependent grant of legislative authority@ (Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448, 473-74 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1905); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976)), that authority is limited to the 
imposition of taxes and spending of revenues. 
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held Aan unconstitutional abuse of the power to tax.@ Id. 14
Here, as noted, Congress did not even bother to label the mandate=s penalty a Atax,@ and 
expressly relied on the Commerce Clause to support both provisions.  See PPACA '
1501(a)(2)(A).  Neither mandate nor penalty is supported by the Taxing and Spending Clause, a 
result that also cannot be cured by reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause (and Defendants 
conspicuously omit any such reliance). 
VII. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF 
CONGRESS=S TAXING POWER BECAUSE IT IS EITHER A REGULATION, AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX, OR MUST BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH SOME 
OTHER ENUMERATED POWER. 
Congress did not state in the Act that it was exercising its taxing authority to impose the 
individual mandate and penalty; instead, it relied exclusively on its power under the Commerce 
Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).  In what can only be 
termed post hoc rationalization, Defendants now argue that the mandate is justified under 
Congress's power to tax.  As discussed supra and further set forth below, this argument must fail, 
since the penalty is exactly what Congress called it - a penalty - and not a tax at all. 
A. The individual mandate is not a legitimate exercise of Congress=s Taxing 
Power because it is a regulation and not a tax. 
The Supreme Court has never held that Congress can force individuals to engage in 
commerce so their actions can then be regulated under the Commerce Clause (as executed by the 
14 The Court further noted Athat the power to tax could not justify the regulation of the 
practice of a profession, under the pretext of raising revenue@ and Athat Congress could not, in the 
guise of a tax, impose sanctions for violation of state law respecting the local sale of liquor.@ Id.
(citations omitted). 
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Necessary and Proper Clause).  There is no controlling precedent for such regulatory 
bootstrapping.  That is, of course, why the Defendants had to devise the fallback position that the 
penalty for not buying health insurance is authorized under Congress=s power to Alay and collect 
taxes.@ See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Insurance Mandate in Peril, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at 
A19.  Defendants= invocation of Congress=s taxing power in the last few pages of its 
memorandum, however, fails on three counts. 
First, in the legislation itself, Congress expressly justified the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause:  AThe individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section . . . is 
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of 
the effects described in paragraph (2).@  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (APPACA@),
Pub. L. No. 111-148, ' 1501(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  Paragraph (2) then begins:  AThe
requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature:  economic and 
financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is 
purchased.@ Id. ' 1501(a)(2)(A).  However, Congress levied Ataxes@ elsewhere in the legislation 
B for example, on Ahigh cost@ employer-sponsored insurance plans (the so-called ACadillac plans@)
and on Aindoor tanning services@ B so it presumably understands the distinction.  Although a 
report by the Joint Committee on Taxation released two days before the president signed the 
legislation dubs the mandate an AExcise Tax on Individuals Without Essential Health Benefits 
Coverage,@ the statute never describes the Apenalty@ it imposes for violating the mandate as an 
Aexcise tax@ B expressly calling it a Apenalty.@  Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th Cong., 
Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the AReconciliation Act of 2010,@ as Amended, 
in Combination with the APatient Protection and Affordable Care Act@ 2 (Comm. Print 2010). 
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Second, Congress listed all the revenue provisions of the health care reform for purposes of 
calculating how much revenue the legislation would generate, but declined to include the penalty 
for failing to comply with the mandate.  PPACA '' 9001-17.  Of course, for an exaction to be a 
true tax, it has to be a genuine revenue-raising measure.  See, e.g. Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (AA tax, in the general understanding of the 
term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government.@)
(quoting Butler v. United States, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936)).  When the courts have upheld taxes with 
a regulatory purpose B like the cigarette tax B it was because revenue-generation was still a key 
objective.  See, e.g. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).  (When Congress uses its 
power constitutionally, it is well settled Athat a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it 
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed.@)  (emphasis added). 
In contrast, the individual mandate exists solely to coerce people into acquiring health care 
coverage.  Congress never mentions the taxing power with respect to the individual mandate and 
none of its eight findings mention raising any revenue with the penalty.  See PPACA ' 1501(a).  
Indeed, if the mandate were to work perfectly B ensuring that everybody owned an insurance 
policy B it would raise exactly zero revenue.  Congress simply did not enact the mandate pursuant 
to its taxing power.  To the contrary, the statute expressly says that the mandate Aregulates activity 
that is commercial and economic in nature.@ Id. ' 1501 (a)(92)(A). 
In United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953), the Supreme Court upheld a punitive 
tax on gambling by saying that A[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need, courts are 
without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power.@  In other words, the Court in Kahriger
declined to look behind Congress=s assertion that it was exercising its taxing power to see whether 
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a measure was really a regulatory penalty.  But this principle cuts both ways:  Neither can courts 
look behind Congress=s inadequate assertion of its commerce power to speculate as to whether a 
measure was Areally@ at tax. 
Third, while inserting the mandate into the Internal Revenue Code (which does not 
somehow transform the penalty into a tax, as discussed supra), Congress expressly severed the 
penalty from the tax code=s normal enforcement mechanisms.  The failure to pay the penalty 
Ashall not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.@  PPACA 
' 5000A(g)(2)(A).  Nor shall the IRS Afile notice of lien with respect to any property of a taxpayer 
by reason of any failure to pay the penalty imposed by this section,@ or Alevy on any such property 
with respect to such failure.@ Id. ' 5000A(g)(2)(B).  Yet, other than criminal prosecutions or 
levies, there are no enforcement provisions in the Code.  Thus, the location of the penalty 
enforcement provisions in the Code is - quite literally - meaningless.15
In short, the Apenalty@ is explicitly justified as a regulation of economic activity and not as 
a tax.  While Congress need not specify what power it may be exercising, there is simply no 
authority for courts to re-characterize a regulation as a tax when doing so is contrary to Congress=s
express and actual regulatory purpose.  Never before has the Court looked behind Congress=s
unconstitutional assertion of its commerce power to see if a measure could have been justified as a 
tax.  For that matter, never before has a Atax@ penalty been used to mandate, rather than discourage 
or prohibit, economic activity. 
B. Alternatively, if the individual mandate=s penalty were to be considered a tax, 
15 It is partially for this reason that Petitioners have asked for a "declaration of 
Petitioners’ rights, duties and obligations under the PPACA; specifically, as to whether Petitioners 
must purchase healthcare insurance or be required by the federal government to pay a monetary or 
criminal penalty," in para. 102(b) of the Amended Petition.
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then it is an unconstitutional direct, unapportioned tax. 
For the sake of argument, if the individual mandate=s penalty were to be considered a tax, it 
would be a direct, capitation (or Ahead@) tax that must be apportioned among the States according 
to Census data.  U.S. Const. Art. I, ' 2, cl. 3 & Art. I, ' 9, cl. 4.  The Constitution allows two 
broad types of taxation B indirect taxes such as duties, imposts and excises, which must be 
Auniform throughout the United States,@ U.S. Const. art. I, ' 8, cl. 1; and direct taxes, which must 
be apportioned.  All legitimate taxes must be one or the other.  See Pollock v. Farmers= Loan & 
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895) (APollock I@).  These requirements cannot be ignored.  See
United States v. Mfrs. Nat=l Bank of Detroit, 363 U.S. 194, 199 (1960) (analyzing the merits of a 
direct tax challenge); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82 (1900) (AThe commands of the 
Constitution in this, as in all other respects, must be obeyed; direct taxes must be apportioned@).16
Holding personal property and income taxes to be direct, the Supreme Court also has 
defined direct taxes to include capitation and real property taxes.  Pollock v. Farmer=s Loan & 
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (APollock II@); Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 558.  Contrary to Defendants=
claim, Def. Mem. 41, the Court never has suggested that only property taxes are Adirect@ taxes.17
In Knowlton, the Court simply iterated the holding of Pollock II that Ano sound distinction existed 
between a tax levied on a person solely because of his general ownership of real property, and that 
16 The court in State of Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs. did not rule on the 
issue of whether the mandate would be an unconstitutional direct or capitation tax, but noted that 
the issue has merit: " Although the argument is not only plausible, but appears to have actual merit, 
as some commentators have noted, see, e.g., Steven J. Willis and Nakku Chung, Constitutional
Decapitation and Healthcare, Tax Notes (2010), I need not be concerned with the issue. As 
previously explained, it is quite clear that Congress did not intend the individual mandate penalty 
to be a tax; it is a penalty."  2010 WL 4010119 at *31 (N.D.Fla.). 
17 Any contrary suggestion in Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 175 (1976), was dictum.  
Its result was based on the reverse logic that only an apportionable tax can be a direct tax. 
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same tax imposed solely because of his general ownership of personal property.@  178 U.S. at 82.  
It held that the tax at issue B an estate tax B was an excise tax upon the transfer of property, and thus 
not an unapportioned direct tax as defined in Pollock II.
The individual mandate=s penalty, if it were a tax at all, would be like the direct taxes in 
Pollock I and II, being levied directly on individuals and not on any specific transaction or event.  
Thus, it does not qualify as an excise or other direct tax and, as discussed above, its placement 
among the Internal Revenue Code=s true excise taxes is irrelevant.  Excises are imposed upon (1) 
the manufacture, sale, or consumption of a commodity requiring a taxable event or transaction; or 
(2) a fee levied for the privilege of transacting business.18  As the Court explained in Thomas v. 
United States B addressing a stamp tax on stock transfers B imposts, duties, and excise taxes are 
imposed on Aimportation, consumption, manufacturing, and sale of certain commodities, 
privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occupations, and the like.@  192 U.S. at 
370. A[A] fundamental characteristic of a typical excise tax@ is that it is based on an Aact by the 
person or entity taxed[,]@ and such exactions can be avoided Aby the simple expedient of refraining 
from an act that would give rise to the tax.@ In re DeRoche, 287 F.3d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 2002).  
See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150-51 (1911) (excise taxes may be imposed on 
the privilege of doing business).19
Relying on Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930), Defendants make a novel argument 
18
See Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (excise tax is Aa tax imposed upon the 
exercise of some of the numerous rights of property.@); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 
(1904).
19 Defendants cannot rely on Union Electric Co. v. United States, 363 F.3d 1292 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004).  The tax there was levied on purchasing, not on the refusal to purchase, and does not 
bring Pollock II=s validity into question.  That case distinguished Hylton because the carriage tax 
there was an excise on a consumable expense, not a direct tax on personal property. 
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that a tax predicated on a Adecision@ is indirect.  But Tyler involved an estate tax imposed on the 
transfer of property and only confirms that a tax laid Aupon the happening of an event@ is an 
indirect tax.  Id. at 502.  An excise is triggered by an action, not by the decision to Awipe out the 
distinction between direct and other classes of taxes.@ Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 
137-138 (1929) (suggesting that a tax on keeping property was direct as no different from a tax on 
property).
Nor is the mandate=s penalty an Aincome@ tax, exempted from apportionment by the 
Sixteenth Amendment.  The Constitution allows for three types of federal taxation, depending on 
the event that triggers their incidence:  income, direct, and excise.  Here, income is merely one of 
many factors that affect the amount of the individual mandate penalty B along with age, family 
size, geographic location, and smoking status B and not the tax trigger.  Thus, the penalty is not an 
income tax.  Although the penalty amount turns in part on income, an income tax is levied on 
Aaccessions to wealth.@ Comm=r of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429, 
431 (1955).  The Internal Revenue Code defines gross income in the constitutional sense as Aall 
income from whatever source derived.@  26 U.S.C. ' 61 (H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong. 2d. 
Sess., A18 (1954)).  Thus, to tax Aincome@ there must be an actual increase in wealth; otherwise, 
the Sixteenth Amendment is inapplicable and cannot rescue an improper direct tax.  See Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (the Sixteenth Amendment Ashall not be extended by loose 
construction@ to repeal or modify a direct tax apportionment requirement).20
The individual mandate=s penalty does not require any accession to wealth, does not tax 
20 The penalty also does not meet the constitutional requirement that income taxes be 
Aderived@ or Arealized,@ Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 214 
(1990), because it is imposed regardless of any realization event. 
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Aincome derived,@ and thus is not an income tax.  It does not tax a transfer of property or the 
manufacture, sale, or consumption of a commodity, nor does it impose a fee for the privilege of 
transacting business; thus, it is not an indirect tax.  The penalty falls on each American not 
otherwise excepted.  If it is a tax, it is an unconstitutional, unapportioned direct tax and must be 
invalidated on that account.21
The Supreme Court has defined a direct tax as one Awhich falls upon the owner merely 
because he is the owner, regardless of his use or disposition of the property.@ Fernandez v. 
Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945).  AOnly three taxes are definitely known to be direct:  (1) a 
capitation . . ., (2) a tax upon real property, and (2) a tax upon personal property.@ Murphy v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The new penalty is not a capitation B
a fixed tax levied on each person within a jurisdiction B because it is neither fixed (the amount 
differs based on the above-listed factors) nor levied on each person.  It can be characterized most 
charitably as a negative tax on property, the triggering event being the non-ownership of an 
insurance policy.22
But, as already discussed, the Constitution requires that direct taxes be apportioned by 
population as determined by the census.  U.S. Const. art. I, '' 2, 9.  To satisfy Constitutional 
scrutiny, the method is not complex:  First, decide the total revenue to be raised; second, allocate 
that amount among the states according to population; and third, divide each state=s allocation by 
its population to compute an individual tax rate.  Obviously, the individual mandate penalty is not 
21 Defendants= cases, Def. Mem. 39-41, posited as exempting penalties enacted under 
the Commerce Clause from the limits on direct taxes, involved penalties not subject to 
apportionment because they were not taxes at all.  Like the mandate=s penalty, they were enacted 
to enforce regulations of commerce, not to raise revenue B however little. 
22
See Robert A. Levy, The Taxing Power of Obamacare, National Review Online, 
Apr. 20, 2010.   
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calculated in this way.  If the penalty is a direct tax, it is unconstitutional because it is not and 
cannot be apportioned. 
Finally, as the Defendants note, certain other taxes, such as the Social Security payroll tax, 
have been classified as excises, which are levied on the performance of an act or the enjoyment of 
a privilege.  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).  Although the term Aexcise@ now 
covers virtually even internal revenue tax except the income tax, the individual mandate penalty 
(unlike Social Security) is not a tax on employment or other action B it Ataxes@ inaction.  
Nonetheless, even if it is an excise, the Constitution demands that AExcises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States,@ U.S. Const. art. I, ' 8, cl. 1, meaning taxed at the same rate 
throughout the country.  The individual mandate penalty can depend in part on the cost of health 
insurance offered in the particular market.  PPACA ' 1501(b).  That cost will depend in part on 
rating areas applicable within each state.  PPACA ' 1201.  Thus, the individual mandate penalty 
can vary by location and, for that reason, would be unconstitutional as an excise tax for lack of 
uniformity. 
C. Congress may not use the taxing power as a backdoor means of regulating an 
activity unless the regulations is authorized by the Constitution. 
Even if the penalty is considered a tax and somehow survives the test for apportionment or 
uniformity, Congress cannot use the taxing power as a backdoor means of regulating (as opposed 
to taxing) an activity unless the regulation is authorized elsewhere in the Constitution.  While the 
Defendants are correct to point out that the taxing power is Aextensive,@ one of the few times the 
Supreme Court struck down a federal tax is instructive as to its limits.  In the 1920s, when 
Congress wanted to prohibit activity that was then deemed to be solely within states= police 
powers, it tried to penalize the activity using its tax power. The Supreme Court struck down such a 
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penalty, saying, AThere comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax 
when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of 
regulation and punishment.@ Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).  Noting 
that that law=s Aprohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable,@ the Court held the 
penalty to be not a tax but rather a regulation of child labor.  Id. at 37-38. 
Whether Congress describes the payment mechanism contained in the individual mandate 
a tax or a fine, it cannot so simply circumvent Constitutional proscriptions on its power.  
Otherwise, it could evade all Constitutional limits on its authority by merely imposing the 
utilization of Ataxes@ whenever any individual or entity fails to follow a prescribed course of 
action.  In Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20 (1922), the Court 
specifically ruled that Congress could not impose a Atax@ in order to penalize conduct B the 
utilization of child labor B that it could not regulate under the Commerce Clause.  In so doing, the 
Court recognized, A[a]ll that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to its 
control any one of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states 
have never parted with, and which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to 
enact a detailed measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax 
upon departures from it.  To give such magic to the word >tax= would be to break down all 
constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the 
states.@ Drexel, 259 U.S. at 38 (emphasis added). 
In anticipation of the above argument, the Defendants cite, most strongly, Kahriger, 345 
U.S. 22.  But there the Court also cited Bailey with approval and rejected the proposition Athat 
Congress, under the pretense of exercising its power to tax has attempted to penalize illegal 
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intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of the Act.@ Id. at 24.  See also Sonzinsky v. 
United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937) (AInquiry into the hidden motives which may move 
Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of 
courts.@).  Thus, as stated above, this Court has no power to look behind Congress=s assertion of 
its commerce power and speculate as to whether the individual mandate was Areally@ a tax.  The 
mandate is a regulatory tool explicitly designed to compel the purchase of health insurance.  Tax 
penalties imposed for a regulatory purpose B as here, if the mandate penalty is considered a tax B
must be authorized under an independent enumerated power. 
VIII. THE PPACA=S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
A. The Amended Petition sufficiently alleges a violation of the liberty guaranteed 
against federal encroachment by the Fifth Amendment=s Due Process Clause. 
Petitioners also state a valid due process claim against the federal government, because the 
individual mandate unconstitutionally deprives them of recognized liberty interests in the freedom 
to eschew entering into a contract, to direct matters concerning dependent children, and to make 
decisions regarding the acquisition and use of medical services, including the personal right not to 
disclose privileged and confidential medical information to a corporate stranger.  See, e.g., 
Washington V. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep=t of Health, 497 
U.S., 261 (1990); Pierce v. Soc=y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923). 
Defendants= cited authorities do not address recognized liberty interests on a motion to 
dismiss, but instead analyze the merits of whether a new fundamental right or a new application of 
an existing such right should be recognized.  As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Williams v. 
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Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004), that limited sort of analysis Amust begin with a 
careful description of the asserted right[,]@ followed by consideration of whether such a right Ais
one of >those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation=s
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.=@ Id. (citations omitted).  
Petitioners here have alleged Due Process violations arising from long-recognized interests.  Am. 
Pet. & 79-84. 
These interests are not diminished by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), 
and its progeny, also relied on by Defendants.  Def. Mem. 34.  Those cases recognize that the 
terms on which entities and individuals may contract are subject to regulation in appropriate 
circumstances, but do not speak to the question of whether Congress can compel Americans to buy 
something in the first instance.  Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007), and Vesta
Fire Ins. Corp. v. Florida, 141 F.3d 1427 (11th Cir. 1998), are similarly inapposite.  Like Usury v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), they considered regulation of economic activity of 
those already engaged in the marketplace, per their freely-made choices.  For these reasons, the 
Amended Petition sufficiently alleges a violation of the liberty guaranteed against federal 
encroachment by the Fifth Amendment=s Due Process Clause. 
B. The PPACA Impermissibly Infringes Personal Liberty. 
APolitical freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow man.  The 
fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a monarch, a dictator, an 
oligarchy, or a momentary majority.  The preservation of freedom requires the elimination of 
such concentration of power to the fullest extent and the dispersal and distribution of whatever 
power cannot be eliminated B a system of checks and balances.  By removing the organization of 
economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of 
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coercive power.  It enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a 
reinforcement.@  Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, p. 15 
(2002).  With the PPACA, the federal government seeks to remove two checks on its power B
individual economic liberty and state sovereignty.  Like Friedman, the federal government 
understands that: AFundamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic 
activities of millions.  One is central direction involving the use of coercion B the techniques of 
the army and of the modern totalitarian state.  The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals B
the technique of the marketplace.@ Id. at 13.  The temporary ruling majority in Congress today 
may be motivated by admirable motives but that is not enough to justify unconstitutional 
legislative and regulatory action.  More importantly, it is impossible to draw a reasonable 
distinction between the individual mandate here and a variety of potentially abusive private 
transaction mandates that might follow in its wake.  The Court need not be a fan of the late Dr. 
Friedman or the free market to recognize the obvious danger inherent in giving its approval to such 
open-ended federal power over the individual, which the Constitution does not grant to any 
Congress.
C. The right to be free from governmental coercion is a fundamental right since 
individuals have a Due Process right to not enter into a contract for the 
purchase health insurance from a corporate stranger. 
The citizens of the United States possess a fundamental right to be free of government 
coercion.  Put another way, citizens possess a fundamental right to not be forced against their will 
to exercise any other right.  This freedom from government coercion is both Adeeply rooted in this 
Nation=s history and tradition@ and Aimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty.@ Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
Among the fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States are 
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those explicitly found in the Bill of Rights, including freedom of speech, religious belief, petition 
and assembly, and freedom of the press.  U.S. Const. amend. I.  Elsewhere, the constitution  
prohibits the deprivation of Aliberty . . . without due process of law@ as against the States.  U.S. 
Const. Amend. XIV, and against the Federal Government by way of the Due Process Clause of the 
5th Amendment.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
The Supreme Court has also held that beyond the rights expressly granted by the 
Constitution, the citizens of the United States also possess implicit, fundamental unenumerated 
rights including the right to travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the right to 
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479  (1965), and the right to live among extended 
family, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment has traditionally protected unenumerated rights from infringement by the 
federal government.  ANo person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .@  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Ninth Amendment, in light of its ratification 
history, grants protection to these unenumerated rights by stating, AThe Enumeration in the 
Constitution, of Certain Rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.@  U.S. Const. Amend. IX. 
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth and Fourteenth  
Amendments as granting substantive due process rights to American citizens.  In this regard, the 
Supreme Court has concluded that due process protects against the transgression of personal 
immunities that are Aimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty.@  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937); see Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 191 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
950 (1980).  Without question, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is the right of a person to 
be free from purchasing a good or service the individual does not desire to purchase. 
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In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court defined those Aliberty@
interests protected by the due process clause as follows: AWhile this court has not attempted to 
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of 
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men.@ Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
Such liberty interests implicit within the substantive parameters of the due process clause 
include the right of an extended family to share a household, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494 (1977); the right of a woman to decide whether to have an abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973); the freedom to marry a person of another race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the 
right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right of access to the 
courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958); the right to send children to private schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); and the right to have children instructed in foreign language, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923). 
In light of the above, refusal to enter into a contract in the face of an illegitimate demand 
for a contract is subject to protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.   
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 21    Filed 11/15/10   Page 81 of 95
65
D. Petitioners have a fundamental Due Process right to not share confidential 
medical information with a corporate stranger. 
Compelling Petitioners to enter into a private contract to purchase insurance from another 
entity will legally require them to share private and personal information with the contracting 
party.  Specifically, by requiring Petitioners to abide by the Act=s individual mandate, Congress is 
also compelling Petitioners to fully disclose past medical conditions, habits and behaviors.  Not 
only will the insurer be privy to all past medical information, Congress=s individual mandate will, 
by necessity, allow the compelled insurer access to Petitioners= present and future medical 
information of a confidential nature.  If judicially enforceable privacy rights mean anything, then 
private and confidential medical details certainly merit Constitutional protection.   Petitioners 
should not be forced to disclose the most intimate details of their past, present and future medical 
information.
Even the Defendants must admit that the individual mandate is a direct affront to our right 
to be let alone - a right that most Americans regard as sacrosanct: 
This right of privacy was called by Mr. Justice Brandeis the right "to 
be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(dissenting opinion). That right includes the privilege of an 
individual to plan his own affairs, for, "outside areas of plainly 
harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he 
thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases." 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116, 126.  Hard on the heels of the right "to be let alone" is "the freedom to care for one's health 
and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf."  Id.
The PPACA is a direct affront to our rights to privacy and our freedom to care our own health as 
we see fit, without governmental intrusion. 
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The right to medical privacy is not a new idea - like the desire for marital privacy, it 
predates our nation by millennia.  In Doe v. Bolton, Justice Douglas wrote in his concurrence that 
the "questions presented in the present cases . . . involve the right of privacy, one aspect of which 
we considered in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, when we held that various 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights create zones of privacy." He then quoted a passage from 
Griswold, in which the Court recognized that the right of privacy in marriage is very old indeed: 
"We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older 
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred." 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 US. 179, quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
Similarly, the right to medical privacy is older than our Constitution, in some respects as old as 
Western Civilization itself.   The oldest surviving example of medical privacy in Western 
civilization is the physicians’ duty of confidentiality formulated in the fifth century B.C. by the 
Hippocratic Oath, by which a physician promised: “[W]hatsoever I shall see or hear in the course 
of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should 
not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things shameful to be holy secret.” 
Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of 
Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 267-68 (1984) (quoting 1 Hippocrates 164-65 (W. Jones 
trans. 1923), reprinted in Ethics In Medicine 5 (S. Reiser et al. eds., 1977)).  The influence of this 
oath continued to prevail among physicians of the Western world into the modern period.  The 
common law first clearly adopted the confidentiality principle for doctors only in 1776, in Rex v. 
Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. State Tr. 355, 572-73 (1776). See Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins 
of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39 SW. L.J. 661, 671-72 (1985). 
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 Privacy, like speech and assembly, is a fundamental constitutional right, according to Roe 
v. Wade,  410 U.S. 113 (1973); Adam Freedman, Roe v. Obamacare, National Review Online 
(June 15, 2010).  Although the immediate issue in Roe was abortion, the Supreme Court’s 
decision created a broad “zone of privacy” that included not only abortion but more generally the 
right “to care for one’s health and person,” as Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion: 
It is one thing for a patient to agree that her physician may consult 
with another physician about her case. It is quite a different matter 
for the State compulsorily to impose on that physician-patient 
relationship another layer or, as in this case, still a third layer of 
physicians. The right of privacy - the right to care for one's health 
and person and to seek out a physician of one's own choice protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment - becomes only a matter of theory, 
not a reality, when a "multiple physician approval" system is 
mandated by the State. 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).  Clearly, the PPACA interferes 
with each person's right to "care for one's health and to seek out a physician of one's own choice" as 
each individual sees fit.  Notice also that Justice Douglas was not just concerned about privacy 
outside of the physician-patient arena (such as when insurance companies receive private medical 
information), he was concerned that the government not be allowed to impose additional 
physician-patient relationships on a person.  In other words, even forcing a person to divulge 
private medical information to a doctor not of her own choosing was deemed untenable by Justice 
Douglas - to force a person to divulge private medical information to an insurance corporation 
certainly is even more untenable from a constitutional standpoint. 
The millennia-old desire for medical privacy cuts across many social and ideological lines.  
The "Coalition for Patient Privacy" is a diverse coalition of three dozen organizations, including 
Microsoft and the ACLU, together with one Senator and House Member.  In a letter to Congress 
dated January 14, 2009, the Coalition wrote:  "Personal health information should not be sold and 
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shared as a typical commodity. Health information is different; it is extremely sensitive and can 
directly impact jobs, credit, and insurance coverage. Commercial transfers undermine routine 
privacy safeguards, including transparency and accountability."  Exhibit 1.  The indisputable 
fact that medical information is amongst the most private and sensitive information that anyone 
has is demonstrated by the following passage from an amicus brief filed in the State of Florida 
several years ago: 
The relationship between a doctor and his or her patient in our 
society is unique; indeed, the level of trust attendant to that 
relationship can exceed that between even a husband and a wife. A 
physician is privy to the most private details of a person’s life, 
details which could be devastating to the patient’s personal, social, 
and professional life if revealed to third parties. The patient’s 
medical records may reveal treatment for depression and details of 
suicidal thoughts or attempts not otherwise disclosed from a review 
of the patient’s pharmacy records. Treatment for Hepatitis C may 
disclose past intravenous drug usage. The patient’s medical history 
may disclose the fact that as a young woman the patient received an 
abortion or had a child out of wedlock which was later put up for 
adoption. No one other than the patient and his or her physician 
should be privy to this information absent consent of the patient.
Exhibit 2, at 6-7 (emphasis added).  This passage illustrates not only some of the reasons why 
medical privacy is so vital to Americans, but also the universality of our desire to protect our 
medical privacy.  This amicus brief was written by the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida 
in support of appellant Rush Hudson Limbaugh III, an ideologically conservative political pundit 
who is a well-known critic of the ACLU.  Mr. Limbaugh and the ACLU have their political 
differences, but they are on the same side of this issue - the side of personal liberty.   
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court described Roe as a rule of “personal 
autonomy” that protects all “intimate and personal choices . . . central to personal dignity” in 
matters “fundamentally affecting a person.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
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505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  In judging which decisions are constitutionally protected as those “that 
an individual may make without unjustified government interference,” the Court has set forth two 
criteria:  they must be “personal decisions,” meaning they must primarily involve one's self or 
one's family, and they must be “important decisions,”  which profoundly affect one's development 
or one's life.  Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980), quoting Carey v. 
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).  Consistent with these broad 
principles, courts have held have held that the right to privacy includes, for example, the right to 
refuse even life-saving medical treatment:  "The decision to obtain or reject medical treatment, no 
less than the decision to continue or terminate pregnancy, meets both criteria."  Id. at 1046-47.  If 
the right to medical privacy is so broad that it encompasses the right to "obtain or reject medical 
treatment," how can it not encompass the right to either purchase or not purchase health insurance 
as each individual sees fit? 
Because the right to privacy is deemed fundamental, any statute that threatens that right is 
subject to “strict scrutiny” by the courts. It is difficult to see how the individual mandate can 
survive such scrutiny. After all, if the right to privacy guarantees our liberty to make “intimate,” 
“personal” decisions relating to “health,” “dignity,” and “autonomy,” it must also protect our right 
not to apply for or buy health insurance.   If the Constitution prohibits government from dictating 
decisions that “full adult humans” can otherwise make for themselves, how can the same 
Constitution authorize Congress to force adult citizens to enter into particular private contracts? 
The threat to privacy does not end there. Because of the individual mandate, each citizen 
will be required to divulge, on an ongoing basis, personal medical details to an insurance company. 
Defendants' brief basically says that Petioners should not worry about this because they are only 
being made to disclose this information to insurance companies, which is somehow not the same 
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as a "public" disclosure.  Defendants even compare insurance companies to "government 
archivists with an 'unblemished record . . . for discretion."  Def. Mem. at 38.  Petitioners, 
however, do not wish to trust their information with any insurance company, and they are hardly 
alone in this regard.  Defendants contends that petitioners we can trust insurance companies 
because those corporations must abide by HIPPA.  Indeed, an individual who believes that the 
Privacy Rule is not being upheld can go through the complex process of filing a complaint with 
the Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR), see
45 C.F.R. 160.306.  However, according to the Wall Street Journal, the OCR has a long backlog 
and ignores most complaints. "Complaints of privacy violations have been piling up at the 
Department of Health and Human Services. Between April 2003 and Nov. 30, the agency fielded 
23,896 complaints related to medical-privacy rules, but it has not yet taken any enforcement 
actions against hospitals, doctors, insurers or anyone else for rule violations."  Theo Francis 
Spread of records stirs fears of privacy erosion, Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2006.  
Unfortunately, HIPPA allows bill collectors, fund raisers and marketers to receive our confidential 
information from our insurers, and the PPACA mandates that we purchase this insurance.  Id.
There is thus a direct link between governmental action (the mandate) and public disclosure of our 
most private and intimate details.   
Defendants heavily speculate that Petitioners might not have to disclose private 
information to the insurance companies that are forced upon them, though they also admit that they 
just don't know: "It remains unknown whether plans might be available that specifically address 
individual privacy concerns."  Def. Mem. at 49.  It is known, however, that the PPACA does not 
have any protections at all that would stop insurance companies from requiring disclosure of 
medical information during the application process, and no one can explain how an insurance 
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company can then be billed for services without knowing what those services are.  Insurance 
companies will gather immense amounts of medical information simply in the course of paying for 
diagnostic tests, treatments, routine examinations, etc.23  Before the PPACA, a person could opt 
out of this system by simply paying for medical expenses out of pocket - now, people must either 
apply for and maintain insurance coverage or face a penalty.  Clearly, this is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy.  
The Act=s individual mandate expressly violates Petitioners fundamental rights they enjoy 
as part of the Aliberty@ interest under the Fifth Amendment.  Fundamental rights such as Athe right 
to make one=s own health care decisions,@ Athe right to abstain from entering into a contractual 
relationship with another private entity@ and Athe right to not be compelled to divulge private 
medical information to another private entity@ are deeply rooted in American history and tradition 
and implicated by the imposition of the Act.  The Act=s individual mandate represents an abuse of 
Congressional authority and a clear violation of substantive due process protections, since 
Petitioners benefit from a constitutionally protected interest in making certain kinds of important 
decisions free from governmental compulsion.   
E. Freedom from Government Coercion is Deeply Rooted in This Nation=s
History. 
A plain reading of all of the recognized fundamental rights of the citizens of the United 
States demonstrates that the freedom from government coercion is a thread common throughout 
23 There is even an occupational field that specializes in gathering medical information and 
sending it to insurance companies.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics has a category for 'Medical 
Records and Health Information Technicians" who "assemble patients' health information 
including medical history, symptoms, examination results, diagnostic tests, treatment methods, 
and all other healthcare provider services."  Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11 Edition.  
Currently there are over 172,500 people doing this job; "they often serve as liaisons between 
healthcare facilities, insurance companies, and other establishments," according to the federal 
government.  Id.   
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the history and traditions of the United States.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 
(1965).  Not only do each of the fundamental rights reserved to the people by the Constitution 
reflect this tradition, but also the express powers and prohibitions to the federal government reflect 
the cognizance of the Constitution=s drafters that the chief notion of liberty protected by the 
Constitution is freedom from governmental coercion.
For example, the fundamental rights protected within the First Amendment include 
freedom of speech and religion.  U.S. Const. amend. I.  But along with those rights, the 
Constitution grants the freedom from giving coerced testimony in the 5th Amendment, and 
prohibits the Congress from establishing a religion and coercing citizens to participate in it.  U.S. 
Const. amend. V and I.  The Constitution mandates that people be free from being coerced by 
government into allowing police into their homes or searching their person, absent a warrant 
supported by a showing of probable cause.  U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
As a converse, the Constitution limits the ability of government to interfere in the lives of 
the people who are otherwise living freely and lawfully.  As mentioned above, government may 
search homes, but only when authorized to do so by warrant supported by probable cause.  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. Congress is forbidden from suspending the writ of habeas corpus, which 
protects the people from being restrained or coerced from moving about freely against their will 
without just cause.  U.S. Const. art. I, ' 9.  When prosecuting a person in a criminal trial, the 
government is forbidden from holding a person indefinitely and required to try that person quickly 
and publicly.  U.S. Const. Amend. VI.  Likewise, the government may not try a person twice for 
the same crime.  U.S. Const. Amend. V.  Read together, these provisions of the Constitution 
establish that when government regularly exercises its coercive authority over the people, its 
powers to do so are restrained.  The Constitution presumes liberty.  In explaining the reasoning 
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behind its fundamental structure, James Madison wrote Ato lay a due foundation for that separate 
and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which, to a certain extent, is admitted 
on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should 
have a will of its own . . .@  Federalist No. 51. (emphasis added). 
Liberty, at its most basic sense, is the Afreedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint, 
especially by a government,@ but liberty also includes Athe absence of a legal duty imposed on a 
person.@  Black=s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).  The PPACA infringes on this second notion of 
liberty.  The Act imposes on the people of the United States, collectively and individually, a new 
duty to purchase health insurance with required Aminimum essential coverage.@  Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, ' 1501A(b)(1).  Crucially, the 
PPACA does not tax, regulate, or control a person who is engaged in any positive conduct at all, 
but reaches individuals who are by its very definition engaged in no conduct at all.  Freedom from 
this sort of coercion is implicit in any concept of ordered liberty. 
At first blush, this "nanny state" use of government coercion may seem benign.  After all, 
Defendants may argue that most people purchase health care insurance on their own or through 
their employers, and a significant majority of those without insurance would do so were it more 
affordable.  This reasoning is dangerous to all fundamental liberties.  Imagine, for example, if 
Congress passed a law requiring people to purchase Aminimum essential@ food.  After all, what 
could be more essential than Ahealth,@ but healthy food.  Under the Act=s logic, most people 
already purchase their own food and many who cannot, would do so were more food affordable.  
If there were nothing incongruous with liberty and the Act, then Congress would be permitted to 
require people to buy the Aminimum essential@ food it deems appropriate.  If Congress is capable 
under the Constitution of so coercing the people, then it is impossible to fathom any limit to its 
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powers.  This result cannot be countenanced against the Constitution handed down to us by the 
Framers. Writing on their intent to protect a broader scope of liberty in the Constitution, Justice 
Brandeis wrote, AThey conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone B the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.@ Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) 
F. The Governmental interest furthered by the individual mandate is 
insufficiently compelling and not narrowly tailored. 
If Congress wishes to abridge the fundamental right to be free from governmental 
coercion, then such abridgement deserves heightened judicial scrutiny and a narrowing of the 
Apresumption of constitutionality@ of the legislation.  United States v. Carolene Products, 304 
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  The burden is on the government to justify an infringement of 
fundamental rights by demonstrating that the legislation is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling governmental interest.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  After identifying 
the rising costs of health care, and the problem of people waiting until injury to purchase health 
insurance, the PPACA identifies the government=s interest in the individual requirement as, 
A[s]ignificantly increasing health insurance coverage . . . will minimize this adverse selection and 
broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health 
insurance premiums.@  Is lowering the price of health insurance premiums a sufficiently 
compelling government interest to justify governmental coercion?  Is requiring individuals to 
purchase health insurance sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve this interest?  When compared 
to prior Supreme Court precedent, the PPACA fails this high standard. 
For example, in Hirabayashi v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff=s
due process rights yielded to the exigencies of war-time emergency and the legitimate application 
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of Congress=s war power. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  Likewise, in 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff=s right to refuse medical 
treatment yielded to the government=s interest in preventing a pandemic.  The rising cost of health 
care does not pose such a threat as disease or foreign invasion to justify an infringement of a 
fundamental right. 
Requiring those without health insurance to purchase it does not further a compelling 
government interest in a narrowly tailored manner.  The government compels those without 
coverage so as to aggregate those purchase with those it seeks to benefit.  The requirement of 
minimum essential coverage does not at its core further the interest of those who fall under the 
clause=s power, but only those who cannot afford insurance.  As an alternative, Congress could 
easily raise revenues via its power to tax and then spend those revenues to subsidizing those who 
cannot afford to buy health insurance, just as it does for food and education B without infringing on 
the due process rights of the people.  However, as currently written, the PPACA=s provision does 
not conform to well-defined modes of constitutionally permissible taxation. See Willis and Chung, 
Of Constitutional De-Capitation of Health Dare, 127 Tax Notes 9 (2010). 
IX. CONCLUSION. 
This case presents the Court with Athe arduous . . . task of marking the proper line of 
partition between the authority of the general and that of the State governments.@  The Federalist 
No. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  The PPACA is unprecedented B
quite literally, without any legal precedent B both in its regulatory scope and its expansion of 
federal authority over states and individuals.  As the Congressional Budget office said in 1994, 
AThe government has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful 
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residence in the United States.@  Cong. Budget office, The Budgetary Treatment of an individual 
mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).  Never before has it been said that every man, woman 
and child faces a civil penalty for declining to participate in the marketplace, nor have courts had to 
consider such a breathtaking assertion of raw power.  Even in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 
(1942), the federal government did not claim the power to mandate that people become farmers or 
enter into commercial transactions. 
At issue is the constitutionality of the individual mandate C the requirement that 
individuals obtain a government-approved health insurance policy or pay a penalty.  Congress 
specifically and expressly identified the Commerce Clause as the source of its authority, a position 
the Defendants now assert in its Motion to Dismiss.  Because Petitioners persuasively refute that 
argument, Defendants have been forced to argue alternative grounds for their unconstitutional 
power-grab, even though the President and Congress were adamant in declaring the mandate to be 
a penalty and not a Atax@ increase.  However, even if the individual mandate were by fiat 
considered to be a tax, it would still be unconstitutional because it is neither apportioned (if a direct 
tax) nor uniform (if an excise tax).  Moreover, Congress cannot use the taxing power as a 
backdoor means of regulating an activity unless such regulation is authorized elsewhere in the 
Constitution.  Anglo-American common law (where the Court must look to determine the nature 
and scope of protected liberty interests) always has disfavored imposition of affirmative 
obligations absent some duty either willingly undertaken or properly inferred.  See, e.g. Hasenfus 
v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 1999) (AUnder common law, inaction rarely gives rise to 
liability unless some special duty of care exists.@).
As the United States Supreme Court recognized almost 150 years ago, A[n]o graver 
question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the 
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whole,@ than the Government=s unconstitutional assertion of power against its own citizens.  Ex
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 1, 118-19 (1866) (granting habeas corpus petition).  Either the motion to 
dismiss this lawsuit must be denied or the Constitution must be re-written by judicial fiat.   
Petitioners therefore respectfully request that Defendants= Motion to Dismiss be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November 15, 2010.    
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